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VERTICAL INTEGRATION AND THE MILITARY –  
A STRATEGIC APPROACH TO THE OUTSOURCING DECISIONS 




It is a common belief that government organizations are generally less effective 
and efficient than commercial entities.  Among the prominent problems that need to be 
addressed in this context is the process leading to a decision regarding how to source 
activities.  Consequently, current publications and laws require government activities to 
compete with commercial contractors. Also, a preference for outsourcing military 
activities is often expressed. 
This MBA project investigates how applicable economic principles that govern 
the sourcing decision in the commercial world are to the military.  It further reviews the 
laws that regulate the decision making process for the military.  The project then 
evaluates how these different factors should impact the process and whether recent 
outsourcing decisions, especially for Operation Iraqi Freedom, reflect valid economic 
criteria. 
The MBA project determines that valid economic principles are applicable to the 
military, but they are not always used correctly or to the advantage of the government.  
Additional socio-economic and military factors also have a significant influence and need 
to be weighed against the economic principles, stressing distinctions between the military 
and a commercial company.  Those differences and their potential effects are not 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Read not to contradict and confuse, nor to believe and take for granted, nor to find 




This chapter explains the methodology behind this project paper.  It defines the 
application of expressions such as Vertical Integration (VI) and Outsourcing within the 
remainder of the study, as well as other terms used.  It also touches on the applicability of 
these terms within the organization of the Department of Defense.  
 
B. METHODOLOGY OF PROJECT 
1. Background 
With EXECUTIVE ORDER 12526, President Reagan established a Blue Ribbon 
Commission on Defense Management.  The commission was chartered with studying 
issues of defense management and organization (Blue Ribbon Commission, Appendix 
27).  In its final report (A Quest for Excellence) the commission recommended in 1986, 
among other proposals, “the expanded use of commercial products and ‘commercial 
style’ competition in the defense procurement process” (Blue Ribbon Commission, 
Appendix 75).  While similar suggestions had been made in 1972, without successful 
implementation in the defense acquisition community, the commission now stated that 
substantial changes in procurement policy would be necessary to take advantage of the 
commercial marketplace (Blue Ribbon Commission, Appendix 77).   
Outsourcing was one way of taking advantage of the commercial marketplace that 
the Department of Defense (DOD) had already practiced for some time.  The most 
obvious area might have been purchases of products for the military.  But even as early as  
the 1960s, the military began to contract logistics and other services to commercial 
providers.  With the end of the Cold War and the rising demand for a ‘Peace Dividend,’ 
the DOD is more and more looking towards the commercial world to compensate for the 
                                                 
1 Quoted in Microsoft Encarta College Thesaurus (1097). 
2 
decline of the defense budget.  Pressure and increased criticism from Congress forces the 
DOD to consider commercial business practices to improve the value the military will get 
out of the appropriated funds.  Furthermore, these funds might only be granted in the first 
place if the DOD can prove that a request not only is essential to the military strategy of 
the U.S., but also makes business sense.  As a society, the military is also becoming 
increasingly service oriented.  Consequently, a growing number of traditionally military 
activities are being considered for potential outsourcing.  
A report by the United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) on 
Sourcing and Acquisition from 2003 concludes that “it is important for the Department to 
adopt business practices that will enable it to acquire the systems and services to allow it 
to operate effectively” (Government Accountability Office, GAO-03-574T 14).  The 
same report points out that: 
Government agencies increasingly are relying on services to accomplish 
their missions. The Department of Defense now spends more than half its 
contracting dollars acquiring services, about $77 billion in fiscal year 
2001, […]. In addition, the department reports that it has over 400,000 
employees performing commercial-type services. Determining whether to 
obtain required services using federal employees or through contracts with 
the private sector is an important economic and strategic decision.  
(Government Accountability Office, GAO-03-574T 2) 
This strategic ‘make or buy’ decision is governed by the same principles that 
commercial corporations have to evaluate when facing the identical question.  There are 
several factors to be considered within the DOD that are not dominated by economic 
rules.  The DOD needs to take into account all these considerations when making its 
choice between a commercial and a military provider.  
 
2. Objective and Research Questions 
This MBA paper investigates the rationale behind recent outsourcing decisions in 
the United States (U.S.) military.  It determines if the decisions followed valuable general 




and regulations.  It further determines if sourcing decisions for the military need to take 
additional aspects into account that are not covered by economic or current regulatory 
doctrines. 
The examination focuses on the following research questions: 
 
 Are there differences between the military and a commercial company 
with regard to what influences the sourcing decision? 
 Are economic principles applied to the military’s sourcing decision? 
 Are current laws and regulations adequately addressing all considerations 
required for the sourcing decision process? 
 Are current laws and regulations applied to the military’s sourcing 
decision? 
 
3. Scope and Limitations 
a. Scope 
The project is intended to analyze the factors that influence the sourcing 
decisions within the U.S. Department of Defense.  It focuses on the applicability of 
common economic principles as well as on the regulatory tools currently used to control 
the decision making process. 
 
b. Limitations 
The paper is limited to the theoretical principles that generally affect the 
evaluation of sourcing alternatives at the time of decision making.  It does not intend to 
provide explicit solutions to specific problems nor does it judge whether the chosen 
examples actually achieved their intended purpose or not.  The case examples are 
referring to these areas: logistics, support, and services for the U.S. military in recent 
contingency operations, particularly the war in Iraq.  
 
4. Methodology 
The study is divided into three parts. First, the generic economic principles behind 
the sourcing (‘make or buy’) decisions and the laws and regulations governing the 
4 
process are explored by a literature review.  Economic criteria are retrieved from 
textbooks and from scientific articles.  Regulatory elements are extracted directly from 
the appropriate laws, as well as from secondary sources such as implementation guides 
and legal comments.  Second, the rationale for outsourcing recent contracts, using mainly 
the case of Private Military Firms (PMF) in Iraq, is investigated by using government and 
civilian publications on the subject, research papers, and especially investigations by the 
Government Accountability Office.  Third, case information is compared to the earlier 
extracted economic and regulatory criteria to determine if those criteria were applicable 
and followed.  It is also determined if and what additional aspects, such as special 
military or socio-economic factors, might exist that would affect the outcome of a 
decision. 
 
5. Organization of Study 
The project consists of five chapters. Chapter I provides a short background, 
explains the organization of the study, and defines necessary terms.  Chapter II 
determines economic factors influencing the outsourcing decision through a review of 
business literature. It also examines U.S. government publications and regulations 
regarding the sourcing question for federal agencies. Chapter III describes actual 
outsourcing decisions within the U.S. military, focusing mainly on contractors on the 
battlefield in recent conflicts in the Balkans and in Iraq.  Chapter IV compares the actual 
case examples with the economic principles, as well as the government regulations 
reviewed in Chapter II.  Additionally, it introduces and analyzes additional socio-
economic issues, i.e., military, political, and legal, that might have an impact on the 




1. Vertical Integration 
 
Vertical Integration: 
“Involving all the consecutive stages in the production of goods” 
Microsoft Encarta College Dictionary 
 
a. Description 
The process that is required to produce and sell a product or service is 
usually referred to as the ‘vertical chain’ or ‘supply chain.’  Besanko, Dranove and 
Shanley explain that it “begins with the acquisition of raw materials and ends with the 
distribution and sale of finished goods and services” (109).  A firm that wants to market a 
certain product or service has to decide whether it is willing and able to perform all the 
required activities alone, or if it will work together with other firms to achieve this goal.  
Hart lists two principal ways in which a relationship between two firms can be 
conducted. The firms could have what he calls an “arms-length” contract, each still 
remaining independent. They also could merge into a single firm and carry out 
transactions within the fused entity (Hart C69).  It will choose the form that it believes is 
most beneficial for its future activities.  By drawing the limits between performing 
activities itself or purchasing from independent entities, the firm defines its “vertical 
boundaries” (Besanko, Dranove and Shanley 109).     
A firm that conducts several consecutive activities within its boundaries is 
considered to be vertically integrated (see Figure 1).   According to Porter, the vertical 
integration defines the division of activities between a firm and its suppliers, channels, 
and buyers (55).  Schmalensee and Willig state two categories of a fully integrated firm: 
1) The entire output of the ‘upstream’ process is employed as part or 
all of the quantity of one intermediate input to the downstream process 
or 
2) The entire quantity of one intermediate input into the 
‘downstream’ process is obtained from part or all the output of the 
‘upstream’ process. (185) 
 
They call the case in which “most of the output of the upstream process is 
employed as most of the input in the downstream process” ‘partial’ vertical integration 
6 
(Schmalensee and Willig 185).  An important determinant of vertical integration is the 
ability of the firm to make all the important decisions regarding their integrated stages.2  
Within the vertical chain, the firms are referred to as being upstream or 
downstream from each other (see Figure 1).  Their relative position is dependent on their 
performed activities.  Early activities in the production are considered to be upstream, 
later activities are consequently downstream.3  These activities are often sequential, but 
they can also be performed in parallel.  In the case of a lumber mill, the purchase of a 
forest where trees can be harvested would be an upstream integration.  Taking over a 
retail store selling planks, etc. would be an example of a downstream integration. 
 






























                                                 
2 Compare Schmalensee and Willig: “complete flexibility to make the investment, employment, 
production, and distribution decisions” (186). 
3 Besanko, Dranove and Shanley explain the terminology as follows: “Economists say that early steps 
in the vertical chain are upstream in the production process, and later steps are downstream, much as 
lumber flows from upstream lumber forests to downstream mills.” (110). 
7 
b. Military Relevance 
In a business sense, the military was, and often still is, a very integrated 
corporation.  Especially in the logistics and services sphere, the military used to own all 
steps in the vertical chain.  Even more, the military has its ‘customers,’ the users of the 
equipment and services also integrated in the same organization.  Here the military differs 
from a commercial firm.4   Nevertheless, the terminology of the vertical integration is 





“Buy labor or parts from a source outside the company or business” 
Microsoft Encarta College Dictionary 
 
a. Description 
The opposite of vertical integration is, in many aspects, deintegration.  
Slywotzky et al. portray outsourcing as one example for deintegration (compare 
Slywotzky et al. 100). Outsourcing describes the process in which activities that are 
required to accomplish the goal of the firm are no longer conducted within this firm.  
Instead they are contracted with an independent ‘source.’  Rendon refers to “contracting 
out […] as the transferring of the performance of a function, previously accomplished in-
house, to an outside provider” (16).  Consequently, the term often is referred to as the 
‘make or buy decision,’ i.e., the question as to whether a required input for a product, 
which the firm will sell to a customer, should be made by the firm or purchased.  It can 
also apply to services that are required by the firm to help in the process of producing 
their output. 
 
                        b. Military Relevance 
The military and the government, in general, used to be considered by 
many as  very inefficient organizations.  The idea of ‘reducing’ activities conducted by 
                                                 
4 Although the commercial world has acknowledged to treat consumers of services and products 
within the own company as internal customers, there are not too many examples of firms without any 
external or “…’real’ customers (those who buy our products or services).” (Scott 1). 
8 
federal employees has therefore come up frequently.  Shapiro points out that “[t]he 
government has increasingly relied on private means to achieve public ends. […] While 
this trend has the potential to improve governmental performance, it also has the potential 
to cause government failure.”   
The military conducts a range of tasks that are not necessarily ‘military’ in 
nature.  Some of these include providing and managing housing or food and a wide 
variety of other services.  The military would give up those endeavors that do not 
necessarily require uniformed personnel in an attempt to get literally ‘more bang for the 
buck.’  Consequently, it raises the question to determine what exactly the core 
competencies of the military are.  The Society of American Military Engineers defines 
outsourcing as follows: 
Operation of a commercial activity for the government by a contractor. 
The government retains ownership and control over operations of the 
activity through surveillance of the contract. The primary method of 
outsourcing activities is through cost comparison procedures designed to 




“To transfer to private ownership an economic enterprise or public utility that has been 
under state ownership” 
Microsoft Encarta College Dictionary 
 
a. Description 
Privatization constitutes a second example of deintegration (compare 
Slywotzky et al. 100).  It always refers to government owned activities.  The government 
gives up all interest and involvement in the concerned activity.  It might not even require 
the products or services any longer.  This distinguishes it from outsourcing, where only 
the provider of the activity changes.  Privatization can be controversial, especially when 
control of services essential for the public is handed over to a private business.  The 
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) defines privatization as “[t]he process of 
changing a public entity or enterprise to private control or ownership.” But it “[d]oes not 
include determination of whether a support service should be obtained through public or 
9 
private resources, when the government retains full responsibility and control over the 
services” (Executive Office of the President, A-76 Supplemental Handbook 37). 
 
b. Military Relevance 
The DOD is normally retaining some level of control over the activities it 
decides not to perform in-house.  According to the definition, it is ‘outsourcing’ rather 
than ‘privatizing’.  This paper will concentrate on outsourced capabilities.  
 
4. Further Definitions 
a. Value Chain 
In contrast to the vertical chain, as defined earlier, the value chain always 
refers to the activities within a firm.  Vertical integration consists of the parts of the 
supply chain that are within the value chain.  Michael Porter defines it in his book 
Competitive Advantage, as follows: 
Competitive Advantage cannot be understood by looking at a firm as a 
whole.  It stems from the many discrete activities a firm performs in 
designing, marketing, delivering, and supporting its product. … 
The value chain disaggregates a firm into its strategically relevant 
activities in order to understand behavior of costs and the existing and 
potential sources of differentiation.  A firm gains competitive advantage 
by performing these strategically important activities more cheaply or 
better than its competitors. 
(Porter 33, 34) 
 
b. Inherently Governmental Activities 
‘Inherently Governmental’ is an important definition for government 
activities, as activities so classified are excluded from the competitive sourcing process.  
The exact understanding of it is, however, open to some interpretation.  Policy Letter 92-
1 defines it this way: 
As a matter of policy, an ‘inherently governmental function’ is a function 
that is so intimately related to the public interest as to mandate 
10 
performance by Government employees. These functions include those 
activities that require either the exercise of discretion in applying 
Government authority or the making of value judgments in making 
decisions for the Government. Governmental functions normally fall into 
two categories: (1) the act of governing, i.e., the discretionary exercise of 
Government authority, and (2) monetary transactions and entitlements.  
An inherently governmental function involves, among other things, the 
interpretation and execution of the laws of the United States so as to:  
 
(a) bind the United States to take or not to take some action by 
contract, policy, regulation, authorization, order, or otherwise;  
(b) determine, protect, and advance its economic, political, territorial, 
property, or other interests by military or diplomatic action, civil or 
criminal judicial proceedings, contract management, or otherwise;  
(c) significantly affect the life, liberty, or property of private persons;  
(d) commission, appoint, direct, or control officers of employees of the 
United States; or  
(e) exert ultimate control over the acquisition, use, or disposition of 
the property, real or personal, tangible or intangible, of the United States, 
including the collection, control, or disbursement of appropriated and 
other Federal funds.  
 
Inherently governmental functions do not normally include gathering 
information for or providing advice, opinions, recommendations, or ideas 
to Government officials. They also do not include functions that are 
primarily ministerial and internal in nature, such as building security; mail 
operations; operation of cafeterias; housekeeping; facilities operations and 
maintenance, warehouse operations, motor vehicle fleet management and 
operations, or other routine electrical or mechanical services.  
The detailed list of examples of commercial activities found as an 
attachment to Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Cir. No. A-76 is 
an authoritative, nonexclusive list of functions that are not inherently 
governmental functions. These functions therefore may be contracted. 
(Office of Federal Procurement Policy, Policy Letter 92-1) 
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See Appendix I for a list of ‘inherently governmental functions’ according 
to the Policy Letter 92-1. 
 
c. Commercial Activity 
Inherently governmental activities must be performed by a government 
agency.  Commercial activities, on the other side, are described by the Circular A-76 as: 
 
[a] recurring service that could be performed by the private sector.  This 
recurring service is an agency requirement that is funded and controlled 
through a contract, fee-for-service agreement, or performance by 
government personnel.  Commercial activities may be found within, or 
throughout, organizations that perform inherently governmental activities 
or classified work.  
(Executive Office of the President, A-76) 
 
d. Strategy 
Strategy can be broadly defined as “[a] plan that is intended to achieve a 
particular purpose” (Oxford Advanced Learner’s Dictionary). 
 
e. Strategic Sourcing 
Ball’s approach in defining strategic sourcing is focused on the intended 
outcome of the sourcing decision: 
[S]trategic sourcing is knowing what kind of relationship to develop based 
on market knowledge, the commodity, and the long-term business 
objectives. It is a sourcing process whereby organizations choose suppliers 
in a deliberate, calculated fashion. Selection decisions are determined 
based on factors such as a supplier’s new product development capabilities 
and capacity to share information electronically, or the ability for a 
supplier’s component to differentiate the final product. With strategic 
sourcing, organizations analyze and decide on suppliers based on the 
strategic impact of potential suppliers and commodities on the 
organization or supply chain, instead of simply awarding supply contracts 
to suppliers with a narrow focus on lowest bid. 
(Ball) 
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The U.S. Navy also includes in their explanation the potential managerial 
or administrative results, by calling it an: 
 
[a]pproach to reducing the total cost of providing infrastructure by 
conducting a comprehensive review of a business unit or units considering 
a wide range of options including consolidation, restructuring, 
privatization, make or buy decisions, adopting better management 
practices, development of joint venture with the private sector, asset sale, 
and the termination of obsolete services or programs.  
(Navy Strategic Sourcing) 
 
f. Competitive Sourcing 
The Office of Management and Budget’s understanding of competitive 
sourcing concentrates on the process, deciding which activity will source a product or 
service: 
Competitive sourcing is the process by which the federal government 
determines whether functions described as "commercial in nature" are best 
provided by the private sector, by government personnel, or by another 
agency through a fee-for-service agreement. The Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 sets the policies and procedures that 
executive agencies must use to identify commercial-type activities and 
perform commercial activity competitions. 
(A-76 FAQ) 
 
g. Core Competency 
Prahalad and Hamel described their understanding of ‘Core Competency’ 
in an article in the Harvard Business Review in May 1990 (Prahalad and Hamel).  In this 
article, they declare that a company’s competitiveness is a result of its core competencies 
and its core products.  According to them, “[c]ore competencies are the collective 
learning in the organization, especially how to coordinate diverse production skills and 
integrate multiple streams of technologies.” They especially emphasize the cooperation 
across organizational boundaries and stress that building core competencies is more 
ambitious and different from vertical integration.  Another major contributor to core 
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competencies is the people-embodied skills and their allocation.  Core competencies are, 
in Prahalad and Hamel’s opinion, a company’s critical resource and should be the focus 
for its strategy at corporate level (Prahalad and Hamel).   
 
h. Agency Efficiency 
Agency efficiency will be described in more detail later in the paper.  This 
is the definition by Besanko, Dranove, and Shanley; 
Agency efficiency refers to the extent to which the exchange of goods and 
services in the vertical chain has been organized to minimize the 
coordination, agency, and transaction costs. […] If the exchange does not 




i. Technical Efficiency 
[T]echnical efficiency indicates whether the firm is using the least-cost 
production process.  For example, if efficient production of a particular 
good required specialized engineering skills, but the firm did not invest 
enough to develop those skills, then the firm has not achieved full 
technical efficiency. 
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II. THE PRINCIPLES OF SOURCING  
“Call a thing immoral or ugly … a peril to the peace of the world or to the well-
being of future generations: as long as you have not shown it to be ‘uneconomic’ you 
have not really questioned its right to exist, grow and prosper.” 
E. F. Schumacher (1911 - 1977) American Author5 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Vertical integration was regarded for a long time by the business world as a very 
powerful tool that could be used to solve the problems of a corporation.  Then, between 
the end of the ‘60s and mid-‘70s, ‘value chain specialists’ entered the market as new 
competitors (Slywotzky et al. 99).  Consequently, “[c]ompanies began to realize that they 
could become highly competent in three or four steps of the value chain, but not in 
twenty. Companies that would try to do too many things would do most of them poorly” 
(Slywotzky et al. 99).  Thus, outsourcing was looked at as the better trend to follow.   
For the DOD, the sourcing question is dominated by two considerations.  The first 
is the economic principles that are valid for any market.  Current literature presents many 
questions, arguments, and considerations that are advanced to determine the degree of 
outsourcing, respectively, vertical integration. The second is the laws, rules and 
regulations that directly concern the federal government and the military.  Those have to 
be followed by the DOD and are often independent from the economic considerations.  
The following chapter examines the cost of the outsourcing decision, grouping the 
principles into categories and separating the questionable ones from the valuable ones.  
Furthermore, it will review government publications that govern and regulate sourcing 
questions.  
 
B. ECONOMIC ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE SOURCING 
QUESTION 
1. The Direct and Indirect Cost of In-house Activities 
Whatever the expected benefits are that a company will receive from the decision 
to outsource an activity, the decision always comes with certain associated costs or 
                                                 
5 As quoted in the Concise Columbia Dictionary of Quotations (185). 
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savings.  The calculations might also look different, depending on the fact of whether a 
business makes the decision for an existing activity, or if it needs to acquire an altogether 
new capability.  But before being able to compare costs with benefits, the company must 
realize in what form these costs can occur. 
 
a. Direct Cost 
Some costs can simply be expressed in the form of the dollar amount spent 
if the activity is not outsourced.  Sometimes substantial investments are required to 
develop or improve a capability within a company.  Adam Smith implies the requirement 
of “up-front investments of time and/or money to develop special skills” (Besanko, 
Dranove, and Shanley 119).  These investments often involve ‘fixed capital,’ according 
to the authors, which remains the same, even if demand decreases after the investment 
has been made (119).  High direct costs, therefore, make outsourcing more favorable.  In 
contrast, Buzzell points to the high capital requirements of integrating new operations 
into a firm (94).  Outsourcing transfers some of these costs and risks to the company to 
which the activity is contracted.  This increased risk is very likely to be reflected in a 
higher price which the contractor will charge for its services or products.   
 
b. Opportunity Cost 
If the decision to outsource concerns an already existing capability, the 
firm has to recognize opportunity costs (i.e., the value of a foregone opportunity).  The 
opportunity cost of keeping the activity in-house is the value of selling the assets.  If it 
decides to outsource, the firm has the choice to sell or not to sell the assets associated 
with an existing activity.  Any cost that originally was incurred by developing or 
maintaining a capability in-house that can not be sold for profit, should be considered 
‘sunk cost’ and is therefore not relevant.  In any case, the firm should only include future 
costs or savings in their analysis.  Unless relationship-specific benefits exist which are 
not available to other potential buyers, benefits should offset costs.   
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c. Flexibility 
Substantial investments by a firm that is or remains vertically integrated 
can have a significant impact on that firm’s future flexibility.  The integration reflects the 
firm’s commitment to conduct its business in a certain way (Buzzell 94).  This could 
leave the company without enough flexibility to adapt to changes in the market without 
additional high costs.  Market transactions might be more responsive as the firm can pick 
the provider that is most likely to deliver according to the new requirements.  Grant 
argues, on the other hand, that “where system-wide flexibility is required, a vertically 
integrated set of activities may offer a more effective means of achieving simultaneous 
adjustment at every level” (323, 324).  When considering future flexibility, the firm that 
faces the outsourcing decision also needs to evaluate the level of bureaucracy that the 
chosen solution will face.  
 
d. Transaction Cost 
Any legally binding contract includes a promise (e.g., to provide a good or 
service) and consideration for that promise, usually in the form of payments to the 
contractor.  Additionally to these obvious expenditures, other costs arise.  Brickley, 
Smith, and Zimmermann agree with Ronald Coase who argued that market transactions 
are not costless (521).  Examples of these ‘transaction costs’ are the search for a supplier, 
negotiating a price, opportunity cost of time, legal fees and so forth (Baye 205).  Other 
transaction costs can result from different information between buyer and seller, unclear 
property rights, improperly enforced contracts and concerns of being taken advantage of 
(Coughlan). 
If a company has not outsourced an activity, the internal transaction costs 
may be less obvious.  But even within one company, the actions to set up and coordinate 
the transfer of a product or services from one business unit to another are not without 
cost.  Besanko, Dranove, and Shanley include the adverse consequences of opportunistic 
behavior in transaction costs (134).  The authors argue that the impact of these costs must 
be evaluated against influence costs, which essentially include all costs that are incurred 
within a company when organizing transactions internally, including the costs of bad 
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decisions (125).  Examples of such influence costs are: allocation of resources to one 
division results in fewer resources for other divisions; lobbying time by division 
managers to influence central management towards a certain decision; costs resulting 
from bad decisions. Besanko, Dranove, and Shanley also predict that, compared to a 
larger integrated entity, a smaller independent firm might be more likely to avoid 
influence cost (125). 
 
e. Control 
For many companies, long term customer relations, brand name 
recognition, and a positive reputation are important factors in keeping up demand.  These 
firms are willing to invest significant amounts to maintain these factors; for example, 
through advertising and quality/process controls.  If some of the activities are outsourced, 
the firm loses part of the control over such factors.  Brickley, Smith, and Zimmermann 
point out that hiring less skilled labor might help to cut costs for the retailer but also 
incurs costs in the form of less customer satisfaction.  These costs are only in part born by 
the retailer.  As long as he is also selling products from other firms, and especially if he is 
not depending on returning customers, the retailer has no great incentive to invest as 
much into the reputation of one product or service.  This is called the ‘free-rider 
problem.’  The cost to the business that outsources lies in the reduced demand due to lost 
customers.  If the firm is vertically integrated, the potentially damaging activities are 
within their control and probably without competing products.  The incentive to maintain 
the reputation of the firm is therefore significantly higher, as the success of the activity 
depends on this reputation more than if outsourced. 
Risk is associated with vertical integration and outsourcing.  If the firm 
decides not to outsource, difficulties that arise at the integrated stage could impact 
performance and profitability of other stages (Coughlan). 
 
2. Questionable Economic Motives for Outsourcing 
Some arguments used to justify either of the decisions, outsourcing or integrating, 
are not always valid if just considered on their own.  Some of the reasons might be an 
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incentive to start thinking about outsourcing or an indicator in which direction the ‘trend’ 
is going.  If, for example, many other firms in the same business sector are outsourcing, a 
company might find it worthwhile to investigate this choice.  But it should only actually 
do so if the concrete business analysis proves outsourcing to be the better choice, not 
because it has become the business norm.  The firm should not go that way simply 
because ‘everyone else is doing it’ (even if it could be the right choice for everyone else). 
 
a. Economy of Scale 
Besanko, Dranove, and Shanley claim that a company with a large market 
share would gain more if it does not outsource (173).  They argue “[t]his is because the 
more the firm produces, the more its demand for the input grows and the more likely it 
becomes that in-house input production can take as much advantage of economy of scales 
and scope as an outside market specialist” (173).  The capability to perform an activity on 
an efficient scale is only a prerequisite for vertical integration, not its justification.  In 
terms of economy of scale, it seems to be more important that capacity and requirements 
are in balance, rather than that a business be able to perform on a larger scale.  If the in-
house capacity is not in balance with the other stages, the firm faces excess supply or 
demand.  If it cannot buy or sell the extra capacity for a good price on the market, it is 
wasting money by integrating.  If the firm is able to buy or sell the extra for a good price, 
it shows that the market for this product works well.  In that case, the firm has to answer 
the question why it believes it is better off by integrating this activity instead of using the 
market.  It also has to consider that it might be buying shortage from or selling excess to 
its own competition and whether this is practical or advisable.6 
 
b. Lower Input Costs 
Another argument often quoted is that outsourcing results in a higher price 
for inputs than if the stage that produces the input were vertically integrated into the firm.  
                                                 
6 This assumes that any products a firm requires as input for its activity or produces as output by this 
activity are similar/the same as the products its competition would use.  A lumber company that produces 
excess wood in its forests would most likely be selling that wood to other lumber companies, i.e. to its 
competition. 
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The idea behind this line of reasoning is that, when integrated, the firm could acquire the 
input ‘at cost,’ i.e., without the profit that would be pocketed by an independent supplier.  
If the stage is integrated, the cost of producing the input is most likely to remain the same 
as before.  If the firm does not charge the profit to its internal business elements, it 
forfeits a profit at an upstream level (that it could make if it would sell the input to a 
different company) for the profit it makes downstream (by selling the product that 
includes the input).  Additionally, the firm is stuck with the upstream stage supplier if 
input costs fall.  If the costs decrease enough, the business case that led to the decision 
not to outsource may no longer be valid.7   
 
c. Assurance of Supplies 
Similar to the reasoning above, what is often mentioned in business 
literature is assurance of supplies.  It is under rare circumstances that vertical integration 
can provide inputs that are otherwise unavailable to the firm, potentially even at better 
cost.  This could only be the case if the resources are extremely scarce or come from a 
sole supplier who, for one reason or another, does not want to sell to a firm or charges it 
higher prices than its competitors.8 
 
d. Lack of Internal Capabilities 
One opinion states that a firm should outsource a capability that it does not 
possess, or that the market can perform better.  Grant, for example, alleges that “the lack 
of specialization inhibits the development of individual capabilities” (323).  The 
boundaries of the firm or the business could also change.  One such example is the 
emergence of the requirement that nearly every firm, no matter what business it is in, 
employs some sort of information technology (IT) support.  This is a new capability that 
the firm needs to possess and it has to decide where to get it from.  But, again, the 
primary question here should be why the business does not have the ability to perform the 
activity on the required level (in terms of effectiveness and efficiency).  Determining 
                                                 
7 Compare Besanko, Dranove, and Shanley for a case example (114). 
8 Compare Buzzell’s example from the petroleum industry (93). 
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those reasons will help to decide whether the firm should be developing the ability in-
house, or soliciting it in the market place.   
 
e. Increased Profitability 
Finally, even the simple argument of increased profitability can be 
problematic.  If, under current conditions, one option appears to be more profitable, the 
firm needs to find out why that is the case.  While more profit is surely desirable by the 
firm, the firm might be able to find an even more lucrative solution by adapting its 
operations.  As nothing is one hundred percent predictable, the risks of the decision also 
must be included in the calculation, as well as the long term impact under variable 
circumstances.   
 
3. Valuable Economic Motives for Outsourcing 
There is a variety of valuable and helpful indicators by which a firm can 
determine whether it might be advantageous to outsource or if it should stay with an in-
house capability: 
 
a. Market Conditions 
Competition promotes market efficiency and thus lower prices.9 As a 
consequence, a firm that wants to outsource an activity to a competitive market is more 
likely to save costs than if the market is not competitive.   
                                                 
9 Compare with Brickley, Smith and Zimmermann (519). 
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Also, a declining or consolidating market could lead to independent 
suppliers leaving the market, as they do not expect to make sufficient profits any longer.  
The resulting consolidated market conditions no longer necessarily provide the lower 
prices discussed above, and may make integration more attractive.  A firm facing those 
changing circumstances needs to evaluate why the market is declining.  Only then can the 
firm determine if it should integrate or outsource.  As one can assume that companies 
don’t leave a market for baseless reasons, the firm also must decide if the same reasons 
could affect its own activity in the future.  Obviously, if market conditions change so 
unfavorably for the input, the firm should consider leaving this market altogether.  With 
regard to the military, the case could be more difficult.  Often depending on old 
technology or services rarely used by anyone else, the military cannot afford to just leave 
a market if conditions become unprofitable.  They might need to vertically integrate (or 
not outsource in the beginning) if they are depending on the input and no one else is 
willing to provide it. 
 
b. Market and Bargaining Power 
If a firm considers outsourcing an activity, it needs to consider the 
leverage of the companies in that stage and the influence its own decision will have on 
the current state.  The decisive factor is the relative market power, rather than the 
absolute, between the actors.  While a company might be a very dominant player in the 
market, its leverage compared to another powerful firm might only be minimal. 
If the market or bargaining power of the buyer is higher than the suppliers, 
it will have positive effects on the cost for the firm.  In that case, the downstream firm 
might be better off outsourcing the activity.   
If a dominant firm is currently not present in a stage, it could increase its 
bargaining power by threatening to enter it.  The firms presently operating in that stage 
might consider it more beneficial to remain in the present customer/supplier relationship.  
As a result, they might offer better conditions for future contracts in order to prevent the 
firm from integrating into ‘their’ stage.  Obviously the intent must be sincere, or at least 
the threat must be perceived by the other firms to be genuine. 
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On the other side, a dominated business might find it attractive to enter 
the dominating industry in an attempt to reduce the leverage of that stage (Stuckey and 
White 75).  Saloner, Shepard, and Podolny claim that vertical integration could mitigate 
the power of other segments (254).  But the cost of the required investments to achieve a 
shift in the balance of power might be prohibitive.  Moreover, the outcome is only a 
prediction, which also has to predict the reaction of the incumbent companies to the new 
entry into their market. 
The firm, as well, needs to avoid giving extra leverage to other 
companies with which it is negotiating.  It might lose a considerable amount of 
bargaining power when not having a consolidated strategy for all components of an 
outsourcing contract.  A firm that just bought some equipment from a manufacturer has 
less bargaining power for a maintenance contract (as it obviously needs that contract to 
service the machine it already purchased).  McGahan points out that the timing of 
negotiations can affect the potential hold-up costs and the risks of specific investments 
(9). 
 
c. Source Dependencies 
If a firm is vertically integrated, it can be assumed that it will satisfy its 
need for inputs mostly from internal business elements.  Especially, if significant 
investments were made into the integrated element, it is not desirable to additionally use 
sources outside the company.  Grant argues that this constitutes a compounding risk, as 
problems at one stage can threaten production and profitability at the other stages (324).  
It will leave the firm either without suppliers or buyers, or it makes it necessary to use 
independent contractors at, very likely, high prices.  Outsourcing can mitigate that risk, 
but only if there is a competitive market or at least multiple sources available.  If there is 
only one company to outsource to, the situation is not much different from one internal 
source. 
 
d. Competition with the Firm’s Own Suppliers or Buyers 
The degree of vertical integration of a firm can determine how it is being 
viewed by other companies with regard to competition.  While a firm might be looked at 
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favorably by its suppliers or buyers, this perception can change.  If the firm vertically 
integrates into other stages, those companies can regard the firm now as a competitor.  
Consequently, it might make “independent suppliers and customers less willing to do 
business with the vertically integrated company” (Grant 323).  The new conditions might 
have a significant influence on the outcome of the analysis of the benefits of outsourcing 
versus in-house capability. 
 
e. Relationship-Specific Investments 
To fulfill a contract between two firms, one or both might be required to 
make investments.  These investments can be the procurement of new assets, transfer to a 
certain location (collocation), or hiring of personnel.  If the investment has no alternative 
use other then the current buyer/seller relationship, they are regarded as relationship-
specific. 
When production of inputs involves investment into relationship-specific 
assets, outsourcing might be the less attractive alternative (Besanko, Dranove, and 
Shanley 174).  There is the question of control.  If the assets are owned by another party, 
the firm may get to use the products, but it cannot execute the ultimate authority over the 
assets and their use.10  As contracts are generally not regarded to be complete (i.e., do not 
specify the appropriate reaction for every single possible situation), they do not provide 
the same security as ownership.  Moreover, the contractor might be afraid not to recoup 
his investment into a relationship-specific asset.  He, therefore, could charge a high price 
(to ensure a recoupment under the current contract or the follow-on) for his output.11  
Additionally, a contractor might leave the market if the relationship-specific investment 
becomes too large.   
The firm can evade these dependencies by not outsourcing tasks that 
require large specific investments.  Alternatively, it can provide incentives for the 
supplier to make the investment.  These incentives could include sharing of long term 
plans in order to allow the supplier to plan more effectively for changes.  The firm could 
                                                 
10 Compare the example of PepsiCo bottlers by Besanko, Dranove, and Shanley (177 – 178). 
11 Compare with Vining and Globerman (11 – 12). 
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share benefits from changes with the supplier (who partly made them possible through 
his investments into his relationship-specific assets).  Also, the firm could negotiate long 
term contracts to assure the supplier of their long term commitment.12  
In case of outsourcing, the value chain will only remain stable, despite the 
requirements for investments, if both partners are better off  remaining in a business 
relationship. 
 
f. Coordination and Management within the Stages of the Value 
Chain 
As mentioned earlier, relative market power is more important than 
absolute.  This requires a synchronized flow of production throughout the whole chain.  
For obvious reasons, an integrated firm can more easily achieve this (Besanko, Dranove, 
and Shanley 127).  Decisions that directly depend on or impact other decisions in the 
chain are easier to coordinate within one firm.  Business elements of one firm are also 
less likely to have to pay attention to interests of other customers. 
A counter argument is that some businesses might be so specialized that 
they do not have the expertise to manage other stages in their value chain.  Grant gives 
the example that FedEx could theoretically produce its own trucks, but that the 
management systems and organizational requirements between the two segments are too 
different (besides the obvious questions regarding economy of scale and low transaction 
cost in purchasing trucks) (322).  Consequently, the firm might be better of outsourcing 
an activity instead of acquiring the management capabilities.  The less able a firm is to 
achieve this internal integration (agency efficiency), the more it is better off  outsourcing 
the activity (Besanko, Dranove, and Shanley 170).  If the firm indeed wants to outsource 
these activities, it must make sure that the contracts reflect their need for integration.  
According to Besanko, Dranove, and Shanley, incentives and penalties can help to avoid 




                                                 
12 Compare with Brickley, Smith and Zimmerman (533). 
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supply, outsourcing can be an advantage as the firm does not need to manage an 
integrated capacity at the low periods of the cycle.  It also can outsource only the excess 
capacity at peak times.13  
 
g. Taxes and Regulations 
Government taxes and other regulations are also a form of transaction 
costs.  Brickley, Smith and Zimmermann argue that profits can be shifted from one 
business element to a low-tax activity by charging higher transfer prices (526).  Thereby 
total taxes might be reduced.  The same might work for profits within a regulated 
activity.  Outsourcing might subject a firm to some of these taxes and regulations it was 
avoiding when it was integrated.   
On the other side, outsourcing could help a firm to evade regulations that 
prevent it from directly being active in a business element. For example, a firm could 
outsource to a local company in a foreign country if laws there prevent the activity of 
businesses from outside the country. 
 
h. Information and Property Rights 
  Firms might want to keep certain knowledge regarding their business 
private.  This would normally be anything that gives this firm an advantage in the market 
(Besanko, Dranove, and Shanley 132).  Unless this information is protected, e.g., by a 
patent, other firms might be able to use it to capture value from that firm.  It would be, for 
example, significantly cheaper for a pharmaceutical company to copy a competitor’s 
formula for a drug and it could, as a result, sell the product cheaper.  The company that 
originally developed the formula could not be profitable at the same price, as it needs to 
recoup its research costs. 
Outsourcing could require the provision of some private data to the 
contractor.14  There are several potential negative impacts of this practice.  The 
                                                 
13 Compare business school example given by Besanko, Dranove, and Shanley (129 - 132). 
14 There is a possibility that a company can capture value from the DOD, e.g. by gaining information 
about the highest price the government is willing to pay for a product and using that information in their 
proposal. 
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proprietary data could be used by the contracted company to improve its own capabilities 
(reducing its own research investments) and become a competition to the outsourcing 
firm.  The contractor could also sell the information to a competitor of the outsourcing 
firm, or other interested parties.  Additionally, other parties could gain access to the data 
through the contractor by accident or neglect.  Consequently, the firm needs to make sure 
that others cannot gain access to important information.15  If this cannot be guaranteed, 
the firm might be better off integrating that capability. 
 
C. GOVERNMENT REGULATIONS CONCERNING THE SOURCING 
QUESTION 
Congress has passed several laws that sanctioned the use of commercial services 
and products.  “The longstanding policy of the federal government has been to rely on the 
private sector for needed commercial services” (Executive Office of the President, A-76 
1). A variety of documents have been published providing government regulations and 
policies regarding how federal agencies are to implement this policy.  Among them are 
the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA, 1994), the Federal Acquisition Reform 
Act (FARA, 1996), the Information Technology Management Reform Act (ITMRA, 
1996), and the Federal Activities Inventory Act (FAIR, 1998).  The two most important 
regulations are paragraph 2461 of U.S. Title 10, which provides the basic rational behind 
competing the sourcing of an activity, and Circular A-76, which provides detailed 
instructions on the process.16  For the DOD, all branches of the military have published 
regulations, providing implementation for the respective service as well as general 
guidance and experiences with the process. 
                                                 
15 For obvious reasons, the DOD has not only to be afraid of proliferation of commercial data but also 
of information relevant to national security.  Information systems of defense contractors, containing 
government and their own sensitive data, can be more vulnerable to attack than those of government 
agencies. Compare with O’Hara Defense Contractors May Be Chink in Cyber Security.  
16 The A-76 circular represents an implementation of the FAIR act of 1998.  As the circular contains 
the same requirements as the FAIR act, but is more detailed, it is used in this paper as a reference.   
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1. Circular A-76 ‘Performance of Commercial Activities’  
This circular by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is valid for all 
government agencies, including the military departments as defined in U.S. Code 5, 
paragraph 102 (i.e.,: Department of the Navy, Department of the Army, Department of 
the Air Force), except as otherwise provided by law. It requires all agencies to identify 
‘commercial activities’ within their organizations, and then subjects the performance of 
these activities to the forces of competition to ensure that the American people receive 
maximum value for their tax dollars (1).  A-76 then describes how federal agencies are to 
achieve this goal.   
It is determined in the source selection process which factors need to be included 
and how much weight is given to each of the criteria.  Socio-economic factors are only 
considered when required by law.  It is left to the Source Selection Authority (SSA) to 
think of all potential impacts that their decision will have. 
While some of the instructions are very detailed, only current or future costs of 
the performance of the contract to be awarded are considered.  There are no provisions to 
include, for example, the cost of previous training of government personnel or the 
concept of opportunity cost.  It is hard to predict exactly the cost that will occur if an 
incumbent agency is not selected, especially since civilian government employees are not 
easily fired or transferred.  The agency must either find new jobs for them or provide 
incentives for them, such as voluntary separation payments.   
No factor seems to be included to determine the effect on employees or agencies 
that were only supporting an activity part-time and that might be left without a sufficient 
workload if that activity is outsourced.  Overhead costs are part of the calculation, 
however, only with a standard factor.  The exact impact of an activity on the overhead for 
the affected government agency is not determined.17  The economy of scale for the 
government activities is also no consideration in the decision process. Figure 2 provides 
an overview of the process as described by the GAO. 
                                                 
17 It cannot automatically be assumed that the overhead is reduced by the exact percentage of work 
that will be outsourced.  In the worst case, the overhead might remain the same, thereby just increasing the 
proportion of overhead for the remaining government agencies. 
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All competitive sourcing must be reported quarterly.  Also, the agencies are 
required to monitor the performance of the contract.  Past performance can be a factor in 
future selection.  The contract can be extended through options, but only to the maximum 
performance period as stated in the solicitation (Executive Office of the President, A-76 
B-19).  At the end of the last performance period a new competition must be conducted. 
A-76 also has no explicit requirements to document the farther reaching impacts, beyond 
execution of the contract, of the sourcing decision.   
The following are the main criteria that A-76 requires to consider when deciding 
how to source an activity. 
 
Figure 2.   The A-76 Process  
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a. Only Commercial Activities Can Be Outsourced 
To decide the sourcing question, the circular first of all distinguishes 
between inherently governmental activities, which cannot be outsourced, and commercial 
activities which should be competitively sourced.  In order to determine into which 
category a government function falls, A-76 requires each agency to annually submit the 
following information: 
(a) an inventory of commercial activities performed by government 
personnel;  
(b) an inventory of inherently governmental activities performed by 
government personnel; and  
(c) an inventory summary report. (A-76 A-1) 
 
For all billets that are defined as inherently governmental, this 
classification must be justified in writing, using the principles outlined in Policy Letter 
92-1 (see Chapter I 4. b. – Definitions) and additional provisions in A-76.  If the 
classification of billets is not challenged, the functions will be executed by government 
personnel. 
 
b. Activities that Could be Outsourced Must be Competed 
In order to award an activity, the work to be performed needs to be 
competed fairly.  A-76 and other government conventions such as the Federal 
Acquisition Regulation (FAR), regulate in detail how the competition needs to be 
conducted to be fair.  The competition is open to all qualified bidders, including the 
incumbent government activity or other government organizations.  This stands in 
opposition to one of the assumptions stated by Grasso’s CRS report on A-76 policies.  
She presumes “[t]he federal government should not compete against its citizens” (CRS-
3).  A relatively wide variety of regulations allow exceptions to this rule regulation, i.e., 
sole source contracts.   
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This requirement reflects economic motives as described under ‘Market 
Conditions’ and ‘Source Dependencies.’  It also touches on the problems of relationship 
specific investments.  To achieve the desired effect, it also assumes that more than one 
source is available to perform the activity. 
 
c. Provider Performance Must Be Technically Acceptable 
A-76 requires that the source selection authority evaluate the technical 
acceptability of any offer (B-13).  Only offers promising to fulfill the requirements, as 
stated by the government, can be considered for outsourcing.  Trade-offs in capabilities is 
possible and need to be evaluated by the SSA (B-15). 
 
d. The Lowest Cost Provider Must Be Selected 
The government prepares a Performance Work Statement (PWS) which 
describes the tasks and requirements, focusing on results or outputs (Executive Office of 
the President, A-76 Definitions).  The government then defines the ‘Most Efficient 
Organization’ (MEO), i.e., the optimum government organization to perform the 
activities of the PWS.  Consequently, an In-House Cost Estimate (IHCE) is developed to 
reflect the cost that would be incurred by the MEO.  
A contracting officer (KO) will conduct a solicitation process to obtain 
offers by civilian companies to perform the activities, based on the PWS. A-76 details 
which costs need to be included and by which factor they are weighted.  This allows 
comparing the costs of the different competitors (see Appendix III for an excerpt from A-
76 with the appropriate table).  After evaluating the offers, the KO will chair a board that 
will select the ‘best value’ or the ‘lowest price technically acceptable’ offer.18   
Finally, the IHCE will be adapted so it reflects the cost that the MEO 
would incur if it would deliver the same performance as the ‘best value’ contractor.  In 
comparing the two providers, the ‘lower cost’ offerer needs to be chosen.  “The 
procurement of supplies and/or services from the private sector must be based upon a cost 
                                                 
18 According to FAR 15.101, the ‘best value’ offer is chosen when not the relative importance of the 
price, but other factors, is dominant for the decision (e.g., technical performance). 
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that is lower than the cost at which in-house personnel can provide the same supplies 
and/or services” (Army Publications Directorate, Army Regulation 5-20 Para. 1.5).   
 
2. U.S. CODE Title 10 
This US law has provisions regarding sourcing decisions, especially within the 
DOD.  In paragraph 2461, it prohibits the outsourcing of a government activity to a 
private company before the DOD has issued a report that analyzes the effects of the 
outsourcing.  It even mandates a report on the cost of the analysis (2461 (b)).   
The depth of the analysis required goes beyond the A-76 circular.  It does also 
include economic and military implications.  The formulations of these requirements are 
extremely broad without further details or guidance as to what should be included.  
Additionally, it is only mandatory to conduct the analysis.  There are no 
recommendations about if and how the findings should be considered in the actual 
decision process.  This might be a reason why some are not part of the A-76 
requirements. 
Besides the cost comparison between government and private performance of an 
activity, as in A-76, the following information is required: 
 
a. Estimate ‘All Other Costs and Expenditures’ of Outsourcing 
The provision requires providing an estimate of “all other cost and 
expenditures that the Government would incur” because a contract to a private company 
is awarded (2461 (b)).  There is not much further detail about what these considerations 
should include.  While this statement allows the decision makers to include everything 
they consider important, it is also a very broad claim that does not give good guidance to 
anyone involved.  With regard to the economic principles, this requirement reflects many 
of the principles mentioned earlier, especially the need to include all transaction costs and 
other direct and opportunity costs. 
 
b. Examine the Potential Economic Effects of Outsourcing 
Besides actual costs, the analysis also has to consider the potential 
economic effects that an activity being performed by the private sector has on DOD 
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employees, and the government and the local community (if currently more than 50 
federal employees perform that function) (2461 (b)).  This is, again, a very broad 
formulation that requires economic expertise and thinking of the decision makers without 
determining any boundaries for the considerations.  The requirement goes beyond 
considering the costs described in the previous paragraph and other factors restricted to 
the directly affected activity.  It needs to take into account the impact on other agencies 
within the government, the defense industry and market conditions in general and 
competition with buyers/suppliers in particular.    
 
c. Examine the Potential Effects of Outsourcing on the Military 
Mission 
In deciding the sourcing of an activity, the impact on any military mission 
which is associated with the activity has to be determined (2461 (b)).  This is actually the 
only criterion that introduces military operational aspects (as opposed to technical or 
financial) in the decision process.  It also considers the military side of economic factors 
such as control, information and proprietary rights, and control and management. 
 
D. CONCLUSION 
The criteria extracted in this literature review can be a tool to analyze and 
evaluate the decision making process in regard to the sourcing question within the DOD.  
The economic criteria form the basis to help the DOD determine if an outsourcing 
decision would make sense in a business environment.  The laws and regulations provide 
the standards each decision maker must adhere to and must be reflected in the outcome of 
the decision.  Some of the criterion are very detailed and are practically a ‘how to’ list.  
Others are very vague and leave much room for interpretation by the deciding authorities. 
The following lists are an extract of the arguments discussed in the chapter.  In the 
next chapters, these principles are applied to current examples of outsourcing in the 
military.  Thus, the validity of the choice to have an activity performed by a private 




1. Valuable Economic Criteria for Outsourcing 
 Market Conditions 
 Market and Bargaining Power Estimate 
 Source Dependencies 
 Competition with the Firm’s Own Suppliers or Buyers 
 Relationship-specific Investments 
 Coordination and Management Within the Stages of the Value Chain 
 Taxes and Regulations 
 Information and Property Rights 
 
2. Regulatory Criteria for Outsourcing 
 Only ‘Commercial Activities’ Can Be Outsourced 
 Activities That Could Be Outsourced Must Be Competed 
 Provider Performance Must Be Technically Acceptable 
 The Lowest Cost Provider Must be Selected 
 Estimate ‘All Other Costs And Expenditures’ of Outsourcing 
 Examine the Potential Economic Effects of Outsourcing 















III. CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD 
“In all countries engaged in war, experience has sooner or later pointed out 
that contracts with private men of substance and understanding are necessary 
for the subsistence, covering, clothing, and moving of any Army.” 
Robert Morris, Superintendent of Finance, 178119 
 
“Necessity never made a good bargain” 
Benjamin Franklin, (1706 – 1790) American statesman, writer20 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In order to conclude how adequate the government regulations for the sourcing 
question are, and to determine to what extent they are followed within the DOD, it is 
appropriate to have a closer look at some recent outsourcing decisions.  One of the most 
controversial areas of outsourcing within the U.S. military is the replacement of military 
(and civilian government) personnel on the battlefield by contractor employees.  Civilian 
contractors are providing services which place them directly in a combat zone and 
therefore exposure to significant dangers. Nevertheless, this has become a fast growing 
industry since the conflicts in the Balkans, Iraq, and the Global War on Terror (GWOT) 
in general.  The following chapter describes the tasks and the background of the 
contractors working in Iraq and other conflicts in which the U.S. is involved.  
  
B. GENERAL VIEW OF ‘CONTRACTORS ON THE BATTLEFIELD’ 
Commercial companies that provide military services, or support to the military, 
including operations in combat zones, are commonly referred to as, ‘Contractors on the 
Battlefield’ (COB), ‘Private Military Companies’ (PMC), or ‘Private Military Firms’ 
(PMF).21  In today’s combat operations, these civilian companies play a significant role.  
The rise of commercial firms in the market of global security has been attributed to 
                                                 
19 As quoted in the Joint Publication 4-0 - Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations (Assistant 
Secretary of the Army). 
20 As quoted in the Concise Columbia Dictionary of Quotations (57). 
21 Despite somewhat different definitions in some of the literature, the acronym PMF is used for all 
these companies in this paper. 
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several factors.  Generally, the demand for those companies can be traced to states losing 
the ability and the will to conduct certain military operations themselves.  Singer 
accredits this fact to the lack of public support (especially with the broadcasting of 
casualties), increasing number of low intensity conflicts, and the reduced capabilities of 
downsized forces (8, 9).  Parallel to the increasing demand of private military expertise, 
supply for such services has grown.  Singer asserts that military downsizing at the end of 
the Cold War left a huge number of individuals22 with unique skills looking for new jobs 
(9).  He claims that “[c]omplete units were cashiered, and many of the most elite units 
[…] simply kept their structure and formed their own private companies” (9).   
Additionally, the shrinking of armed forces all over the world also provided the required 
equipment and weapons, including tanks and fighter jets, for the emerging industry 
(Singer 9).   
The scope of the companies’ work is widespread and can include anything from 
providing supplies to directly participating in combat operations. “Today's private 
security companies are corporate endeavors that perform logistics support, training, 
security, intelligence work, risk analysis, and much more. They operate in an open 
market, work for many employers at once, and boast of their professionalism” (Avant).  
Singer makes it clear that PMFs are foremost a company and as such will always be 
driven by profit (7).  The result is a competitive market for security services and 
outsourcing is now an alternative available for a much wider variety of tasks.  And while 
these activities are often regarded as ‘civilian,’ many of them are conducted with the 
possibility to come under fire.   
Singer classifies PMFs by the type of their activities as follows:23 
 
- Military Provider Firms 
Companies that offer services at the forefront of the battlespace and that 
engage in actual fighting and/or ‘Command and Control’ of field units. 
 
- Military Consulting Firms 
                                                 
22 “In the 1990s, the world’s armies shrank by more than 6 million personnel” (Singer 9). 
23 Compare with Isenberg (15). 
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Companies that offer advisory and training services and which also 
provide strategic, operational and organizational analysis. 
 
- Military Support Firms 
Companies that offer rear-echelon and supplementary services (17, 18). 
 
C. MILITARY VIEW OF “PRIVATE WARRIORS”?24 
There seems to be a common understanding that outsourcing and privatization are 
favorable for the military.25  Yergin and Stanislaw make the case that “in response to the 
high cost of control and the disillusionment with its effectiveness, governments are 
privatizing” (13).  Singer states that “[f]ewer individuals are doing the actual fighting, 
while massive support systems are required to upkeep the world’s most modern forces” 
(11).  Additionally, he argues that today’s need for “high-technology warfare” results in 
considerably higher needs for specialized expertise which often has to come from the 
private sector (11).  This can easily be perceived as a shift away from traditional core 
tasks of the military (‘the warfighter’) towards services and products readily available in 
a competitive market.   
The U.S. military has employed civilian contractors for a long time.  But in the 
last two decades, the dependency on PMFs and contractors has grown steadily.  Isenberg 
states that the ratio of military to contractor personnel grew from 50:1 during the first 
Gulf War (1991) to 10:1 during ‘Operation Iraqi Freedom’ (OIF) (7).  Practically all 
government agencies involved in the GWOT or in Afghanistan and Iraq employ civilian 
contractors.  Table 1 shows the surge of contractor support for the Air and Space 
Expeditionary Forces (AEF) during Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) in Afghanistan.  
                                                 
24 Private Warriors, title of a PBS Frontline documentary about PMFs in Iraq (Frontline). 
25 For economic rationale for public enterprises, see Vogelsang (14). 
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Table 1.   Contractor Support Surged During OEF  
(After: Lynch et al. 58) 
 
Type of Support Average for OEF* Pre-OEF Average 
Direct mission support tasks 162 10 
Tons of air cargo moved 1,554 400 
Truckloads moved 705 200 
Total tons moved 9,331 3,000 
*Average calculated from data for October 2001 to January 2002 
 
 
The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) divides contractor support into 
three categories based on the type of contract: 
 
4.1 -- Systems Support 
Logistical support deployed with operational forces under prearranged 
contracts awarded by Service program managers or by Military Service 
component logistics commands.  They support specific systems 
throughout their system’s life cycle (including spare parts and 
maintenance), during peacetime, conflict, and war. 
 
4.2 -- External Theater Support 
Provides support for deployed operational forces working pursuant to 
contracts awarded under the command and procurement authority of 
supporting headquarters outside the theater.  These may be US or third 
country businesses and vendors.  These contracts are usually prearranged, 
but may be contracts awarded or modified during the mission based on the 
commanders’ needs.  Examples include the Army’s Logistics Civil 
Augmentation Program (LOGCAP), the Air Force Civil Augmentation 
Program (AFCAP), the Navy’s Construction Capability (CONCAP), 
United States Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) provision of 
Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF), and war reserve materiel (WRM) 
contracts. 
 
4.3 -- Theater Support 
Provides support to deployed operational forces pursuant to contracts 
arranged within the mission area of responsibility, or prearranged 
contracts through Host Nation (HN) and/or regional businesses and 
vendors.  Contracting personnel deployed with the deployed force, 
working under the contracting authority of the theater or Joint Task Force 
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(JTF) contracting chief, normally award and administers these contracts.  
Theater support contractors provide goods, services, and minor 
construction, usually from the local vendor base. (Assistant Secretary of 
the Army, OSD Supp. ii, iii) 
 
Figure 3 provides an overview where the U.S. currently (as of April 2003) uses 
contractors to support deployed forces.  Table 2 shows which services contractors 
provide to support deployed forces. 
 
Figure 3.   Selected Countries Where Contractors Are Supporting Deployed 
Forces  













Table 2.   Selected Services Provided by Contractors in Deployed Locations  
(From: Government Accountability Office, GAO Report GAO-03-695 7) 
 




Weapons systems support X X X 
Intelligence analysis X X X 
Linguists X X X 
Base operations support X X X 
Logistics support X X  
Prepositioned equipment maintenance  X  
Non-tactical communications X X  
Generator maintenance X X X 
Biological/chemical detection systems  X X 
Management and control of government property X X X 
C4I26 X X X 
Continuing education X   
Fuel and material transport X X X 
Security guards X X  
Tactical and non-tactical vehicle maintenance X X  
Medical service  X  
Mail service X   
 
D. CONTRACTORS IN ‘OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM’ 
The most recent, and probably the most extensive, example of contractor use on 
the battlefield by U.S. forces is Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) and its aftermath. 
 
1. Development of the War 
The shooting war in Iraq began officially with ‘decapitation’ strikes on 19 March 
2003, intended to kill Saddam Hussein and other regime leaders.  This was followed by 
an average of 1,500 and 2,000 air sorties per day during the early days of the campaign 
(Fontenot, Degen, and Thon).  Iraqi attempts to sabotage oilfields initiated the ground 
war 24 hours earlier than intended, beginning 20 March 2003 with the 3rd Infantry 
Division spearheading the invasion (Fontenot, Degen, and Thon). U.S. troops reached the 
center of Baghdad on 9 April 2003.  On 14 April, the Pentagon declared ‘major combat 
engagement’ to be over, while President Bush officially called it the end of major combat 
operations in Iraq on the USS Abraham Lincoln on 1 May 2003.  Since this date, an 
                                                 
26 Command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence 
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ongoing insurgency in Iraq is the focus of U.S. and coalition military forces.  In parallel, 
efforts to rebuild Iraq are conducted by Iraqi, U.S. and international military and civilian 
organizations as well as Non Governmental Organizations (NGO). 
The Army had divided the plan for operations in Iraq into four phases: 
• Phase I. Preparation secured regional and international support, 
degraded the Iraqi regime's ability to resist, established the air 
bridge and secure lines of communications (LOCs) to the theater, 
sought to interdict tactical ballistic missiles (TBM) and weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD), and alerted, deployed, and postured 
American forces. In short, this phase set the conditions to 
neutralize Iraqi forces.  
• Phase II. Shaping the Battlespace included posturing coalition 
forces to conduct sustained combat operations, beginning initial 
operations to degrade Iraqi command and control and security 
forces, and seizing key pieces of terrain. These actions were in 
addition to the ongoing diplomatic and counter-TBM/WMD 
operations.  
• Phase III. Decisive Offensive Operations marked the beginning of 
conventional combat operations. It included the air campaign, 
preparatory ground operations, and the attack north to Baghdad. 
This phase culminated with securing Baghdad and removing 
Saddam Hussein and the Ba'athist regime from power.  
• Phase IV. Post Hostilities operations encompass the transition from 
combat to stability operations and support operations, including 
humanitarian assistance and reconstruction. Interestingly, planners 
realized early on that as coalition forces liberated sections of Iraqi 
territory, operations in those sections would transition to Phase IV 
while Phase III combat operations continued elsewhere. This 
‘rolling transition’ to Phase IV is the hallmark of true full-spectrum 
operations and is one of the defining characteristics of this 
campaign. The distance between forces conducting Phase III and 
Phase IV operations varied from meters to miles, requiring 
remarkable flexibility, initiative, and maturity of the leaders and 
soldiers. (Fontenot, Degen, and Thon)  
 
Presently,27 OIF is theoretically in Phase IV.  But the difference between forces 
still in Phase III and those in Phase IV cannot be measured by distance.  The boundaries 
are practically not existent and shift continuously. The ongoing insurgency results in the 
                                                 
27 Current as of December 2005. 
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area of operations where contractors are employed equaling a battlefield, for the purpose 
of this paper.  The news reports from Iraq especially make it clear that civilians are 
engaged in some forms of combat and the mounting death toll among the contractors is 
further proof.28 
 
2. Contractor Tasks in Iraq 
A PBS29 Frontline documentary labeled the contractors “Iraq’s 2nd largest force” 
due to their large numbers30 (Frontline).  Currently, a variety of companies perform 
different tasks for different customers: 
 
 Support Contracts 
Working for U.S./coalition military 
 Training contracts 
Working mostly for the Iraqi government 
 
 Consulting Contracts 
Working for all military or civilian agencies, Non-governmental 
organizations and companies in Iraq 
 Security Contracts 
Working for all military or civilian agencies, Non-governmental 
organizations and companies in Iraq 
 Reconstruction of Iraq contracts 
Working for the Coalition Provisional Authority (respectively, the U.S. 
Mission to Iraq), other U.S./coalition government agencies (e.g., 
Homeland security) or the Iraqi government 
 
                                                 
28 A detailed and up to date (albeit only partial) listing of contractor casualties as well as other civilian 
and military losses (U.S. and coalition) can be found on icasualties’ website. 
29 PBS is the Public Broadcasting Service. 
30 When judged by the number of personnel, behind regular US troops, before the British forces. 
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Those different tasks result in a large number of contractors and workers currently 
being employed by many different agencies. Frontline breaks down the complete number 
of employees as follows: 
• 50,000 support/logistics contractors. 
These are civilians hired by KBR, the Halliburton subsidiary which holds 
the military's logistical support contract. They work as weathermen, 
cooks, carpenters, mechanics, etc. Most are from Third World countries 
and the majority is Filipinos. 
• 20,000 non-Iraqi security contractors. 
Of these, 5-6,000 are British, American, South African, Russian or 
European; another 12,000 are from Third World countries, such as Fiji, 
Colombia, Sri Lanka, and India. 
• 15,000 Iraqi security contractors. 
Most of these were hired mainly by the British security firm Erinys to 
guard Iraq's oil infrastructure. 
• 40-70,000 reconstruction contractors. 
Hired to rebuild Iraq. Some are Iraqis, but they're mostly from the U.S. 
and dozens of other countries and employed by companies such as 
General Electric, Bechtel, Parsons, KBR, Fluor and Perini.  
(Frontline) 
 
With regard to the U.S. military as employer, the Council on Foreign Relations 
(CFR) lists on its website the kind of tasks which contractors are currently performing in 
Iraq: 
 
• guarding officials, military installations, and supply convoys;  
• training local troops and police forces;  
• providing interrogators, translators, and transcribers;  
• maintaining and repairing vehicles and aircraft, including the guidance and 
surveillance systems on tanks and helicopters;  
• running logistics operations and supervising supply lines;  
• driving supply trucks that carry fuel and food;  
• providing warehousing and storage facilities;  
• setting up Internet access and maintaining computer systems;  
• preparing meals for the roughly 135,000 U.S. soldiers;  
• cleaning military facilities, including Army bases and offices;  
• washing clothes;  
• and building housing. (Council on Foreign Relations) 
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The majority of the contractor personnel performing tasks that have been 
traditionally military are employed in the logistic/support and security segments.  GAO 
reports that “the DOD estimates that there are at least 60 private international security 
providers working in Iraq with perhaps as many as 25,000 employees”31 (Government 
Accountability Office, GAO-05-737 8).    Isenberg has included a short description of 
most of the security companies working in Iraq.32  According to his research, the 
majority of the PMF provide security for assets and/or personnel (see the first bullet in 
the above listing).  They do that for other firms or civilian government agencies working 
in Iraq, as well as for U.S. and coalition troops and the new Iraqi armed forces.  Those 
services can range from consulting to close protection of personnel.  It encompasses the 
guarding of facilities (e.g., oil fields or warehouses) and convoys.  The firms also provide 
training to nearly every kind of player (private or governmental/military) in Iraq. 
Companies also provide airborne surveillance security for U.S. Air Force launch 
facilities, security databases and intelligence information (including collection and 
analysis), and prisoner and prison facilities handling (including the now infamous 
interrogations in Abu Ghraib).  Although many of these companies in Iraq and other 
operations conducted their business in combat situations, none of the category that 
Isenberg calls ‘combatant’ (Singer: ‘military provider’) are currently officially operating 
in Iraq (Isenberg 15). 
 
3. Contractor and Combat 
None of the contractors in Iraq were explicitly hired to conduct (offensive) 
combat operations.  Most of them are performing tasks that are required of many 
companies that are not in a combat zone.  Guard duties, truck driving, maintenance and 
even interrogations are not combat duties per se.  In Iraq, however, practically at no time 
has an established frontline existed.  Consequently, a relatively peaceful ‘hinterland’ is 
missing.  This results in nearly all contractor personnel, notwithstanding how mundane 
                                                 
31 This includes all companies in Iraq, including those hired by civilian US government agencies. 
32 Compare with Isenberg in A Fistful of Contractors (Appendix 2). 
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their activities might be, performing under a constant threat of getting attacked.33  As a 
result, civilians might be armed and engage hostile forces.  Also, contractors get killed 
due to hostile actions.  The first American killed in combat in Afghanistan was a civilian 
CIA contractor (Isenberg 20). 
The other form in which contractors might be participating in combat is through 
the tasks which they are performing.  A contractor maintaining Global Hawk unmanned 
aerial vehicles (UAV) could be considered to be in combat.  Some contractors might even 
be operating equipment for the armed forces. 
It needs to be stressed that none of the applicable regulations or laws regard 
‘combat’ necessarily as an ‘inherently governmental’ function.  For the purpose of this 
paper the important distinction is therefore not if a contractor is in combat or not, but if 
the activity constitutes the performance of an inherently governmental function.  This 
will be discussed in Chapter IV. 
 
E. CONCLUSION 
Contractor support for military operations has significantly grown over the last 
two decades.  It has reached a state where it has become vital to the DOD, particularly for 
the operations in Iraq.  The performed tasks have expanded from traditional support to 
vital activities without which some weapon systems could not be operated anymore by 
the military.  Civilian contractors also carry out more security related duties which are 
reflected in the growing number of Private Military Firms operating in Iraq.  The increase 
in number and variety of tasks, in combination with the situation of a non-linear 
battlefield in Iraq, results in many contractors operating de facto on the battlefield and in 
combat situations in a traditional military environment. 
                                                 
33 The same problem also affects the military.  ‘Traditional’ support troops (e.g., Reserve or National 
Guard), not equipped with the latest technology and often not well trained for combat, are now suddenly 
performing their duties constantly in a war zone.  The most famous example is probably the initial lack of 
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IV. APPLICABILITY OF OUTSOURCING CRITERIA TO THE 
SITUATION IN IRAQ 
“I’d like to see the government get out of war altogether and leave the whole feud to 
private industry.” 
Joseph Heller (1923 - 1999) American novelist34 
 
 
A. INTRODUCTION  
Chapter II described the economic and regulative principles that govern the 
outsourcing decision.  Chapter III portrayed contractors on the battlefield as an example 
of outsourcing.  This chapter examines the government rationale for the use of 
contractors in Iraq.  It then analyzes, using the points extracted in Chapter II, if the 
decision was justified economically and if the decision making process followed the 
government regulations.  It also discusses additional consequences that need to be 
considered when faced with a sourcing decision.  Where applicable, the chapter will also 
raise ‘Questions to Consider.’  These questions should be taken into account by the 
decision makers as they regard issues that could have a negative effect, even if a principle 
is otherwise valid. 
 
B. DISCUSSION OF ECONOMIC CRITERIA WITH REGARD TO 
MILITARY OUTSOURCING 
Business has a clear objective in its operations.  “The company exists to make 
money” is a big revelation that Goldratt has his hero discover in his bestseller The Goal 
(Goldratt 40).  Consequently, every decision a company makes is aimed to secure the 
existence of the company and to assure that it will make a profit in the end. 
Administrations, on the other side, have different priorities. Gordon comments 
that governments don’t make money, but spend it (Marketplace).  One would hope that 
the DOD is actually neither motivated by making money nor by spending it.  Its goals are 
mission driven.  According to Meehan, “military requirements are to be an outgrowth of 
defense strategy built to satisfy national military objectives” (29).  McCaffery and Jones 
                                                 
34 As quoted in the Concise Columbia Dictionary of Quotations (663). 
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stress that the defense budget is in important ways different from non-defense budgets by 
being an instrument of foreign policy and should correspond with the threat to our 
interests posed by foreign nations (3).  There was a common understanding during the 
Cold War that every dime spent by the Department of Defense (DOD) was justified by 
the dangers lurking outside the borders.  The military needed and deserved the best 
equipment, the best everything money could buy to ensure the safety of the nation.  This 
philosophy saw its high water mark during the Reagan administration.  The United States 
(U.S.) outspent the Soviet defense budget and thereby contributed significantly to the fall 
of the ‘Evil Empire.’   
These statements make it obvious that the main focus of military spending is 
guided by the policies and objectives of the government.  The DOD will determine what 
it needs to achieve these objectives and how much money is necessary to do so based on 
an analysis of requirements and existing military capabilities.  But from its first days as 
an independent nation, the United States has kept the right to decide on what to spend 
money separate from those who will spend the money.  As a result, the DOD will only be 
able to spend what Congress appropriates for its purposes.  These funds are normally less 
than what the military had asked for and never limitless.  Consequently, even when not 
being in the business of making money, economic principles do apply to the military.  
Heberling and Kinsella point out that today’s focus tends more and more towards 
affordability.  The DOD needs to strategize if they want to get the often quoted, ‘biggest 
bang for the buck.’  Today the DOD pays close attention to ‘best business practices’ in 
order to improve their operations.  “The emphasis both within and outside the Defense 
Department is to use more commercial products and commercial practices in meeting 
military requirements” (Heberling and Kinsella).  Consequently, it is appropriate to 
examine the applicability of some of the general economic principles that govern 
commercial practices to outsourced contracts in Iraq and similar operations. 
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1. Valuable Economic Criteria for Outsourcing 
a. Market Conditions 
This criterion supports some of the outsourcing of services required in 
Iraq, but not all.   
Some of the PMF’s operating in Iraq already existed in the 1960s or ‘80s 
(e.g., AMK Group or ArmorGroup).  But many of the smaller companies got started in 
the 1990s or early 2000s when the need for such companies increased due to operations 
in the Balkans (e.g., Blackwater, AEGIS, ERINYS).35  One could consequently argue 
that due to the small number of companies, the market for PMFs was hardly competitive 
at the time when the U.S. decided to outsource security in the Balkans and the Middle 
East.  Isenberg quotes Surowiecki in requiring that the competition among suppliers must 
be genuine (17).  Considering the length of the conflict so far and the variety of firms 
employed in Iraq, it appears that a competitive market for PMFs is now developing.  
Also, the market for the development and support of advanced weapon systems, after 
many decades of consolidation in the defense industry, is rather limited.   
Brickley, Smith, and Zimmermann conclude that when competitive 
outside markets are available to purchase goods and services, they should be used (519).  
Avant, on the other hand, argues that the government itself often curtails competition.  
She provides the example of Kellog, Brown & Root, who “won a no-bid contract to 
rebuild Iraqi oil fields in 2003 because the Pentagon determined it was the only company 
with the size and security clearances to do the job.”  This statement seems to indicate that 
the Army did not believe that a competitive market existed for some capabilities.  The 






                                                 
35 Data about the different firms was obtained from companies’ websites.  Those websites were linked 
from Frontline. 
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Questions to consider: 
 
 Does the DOD consider existing competition in the market 
place when requesting a proposal and negotiating the contract? 
 
b. Market and Bargaining Power Estimate 
The criterion generally does not support outsourcing of activities for OIF, 
mostly due to the military’s self declared lack of urgently required capabilities. 
The U.S. government, especially the military, is the biggest source of 
contracts in the U.S.   The contracts awarded for the war in Iraq are worth billions of U.S. 
dollars.  Consequently, one could argue that the DOD’s absolute market or bargaining 
power in the vertical chain should be high and that outsourcing would be the right 
decision. 
But as pointed out in Chapter II, it is all about the relative power.  When 
already engaged in combat or about to do so, the military’s bargaining power is not at its 
highest.  Contract negotiations conducted when it is apparent that the government cannot 
fulfill its tasks without the support of the PMFs obviously put the bargaining power on 
the side of the contractors.  When the DOD justified the push for outsourcing with its 
own lacking capabilities and the inability to provide the required support fast enough 
with military means, it undermined its own bargaining position in some way.  The higher 
costs that can result from these actions need to be recognized in the analysis leading to 
the sourcing decision.  
One tool used by the Army, that can help avoid this problem, is the 
LOGCAP36 contract.  These contracts are awarded in advance (when the bargaining 
power of the government should be intact) and remain dormant until they are needed, in 
which they can be executed fast and without requiring any new negotiations (when the 
government is under pressure).  LOGCAP contracts are normally meant for the early 
                                                 
36 LOGCAP stands for the ‘Logistics Civilian Augmentation Program’ of the U.S. Army. The other 
branches have similar contracting tools available. 
51 
phases of a deployment (up to 180 days) but in Iraq are currently also used during the 
sustainment phase of the operation. 
Questions to consider: 
 
 Can the DOD influence the bargaining power to its advantage 
via the timing of negotiations? 
 
c. Source Dependencies 
For obvious reasons, the risk and threat from being dependant on a source 
is much higher for a military force in combat than for nearly any other firm.  This 
criterion only partly supports the outsourcing decision for OIF, as it increases the risk of 
source failure for at least some of the capabilities.   
As with any other risk, failure of a source is defined by the likelihood of 
its occurrence and its impact on the process.  One of the most important factors in 
determining the chance of being without a supplier (or buyer) is the availability of 
alternatives.  Many of the products and services outsourced in OIF come from a 
competitive market, e.g., fuel, food services, transportation, etc., and could be regarded as 
a low risk.  Other activities are more specialized, such as the security provided by PMFs 
or maintenance of high-tech weapon systems, and consequently bear a higher risk.  The 
risk for all activities is, however, aggravated by the fact that they are performed on a 
battlefield.  In opposition to military personnel, the contracted firm or its employees can 
decide to terminate the contract at any time.  Less severe punishments for contractors not 
performing their assignment, compared to military personnel refusing an order or being 
AWOL37, also increase the possibility for workers leaving their job.  Lynch et al. state 
that the Army experienced poor living conditions because contracted workers did not 
show up (58).  There have been examples in Iraq where contractor personnel has quit 
after being confronted with hostilities or the violent death of coworkers.  While the 
incidents normally concern activities that are not very specialized, such as truck driving, 
they still can have a decisive impact on operations.  A breach of contract will take a long 
                                                 
37 Absent Without Leave 
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time to sort out, especially when the court system is involved.  It might be especially 
difficult with non-U.S. contractors.  Also, personnel might rather bear the consequences 
of breaking a contract than the prospect of death in a combat zone. 
The risk contained in the sourcing decision is twofold.  The more crucial 
risk is the danger to the success of the operation and to the life and health of those 
engaged in it if a source fails to perform as required.  The second risk is the costs 
incurred by the military to ensure that a substitute or back-up is available.  The main 
problem of dependency for the forces in Iraq is the timeframe in which a source can be 
replaced without endangering the ongoing operations.  In order to minimize the first risk, 
the DOD is most likely to increase the second one in the form of higher direct and 
indirect costs of the outsourced contract.   
 
Questions to consider: 
 
 How can the source dependency risk be mitigated? 
 
 Are the direct and indirect costs of mitigating the risk included 
in the cost analysis? 
 
d. Competition with the Firm’s Own Supplier or Buyers 
This economic criterion does not necessarily apply to all companies in 
Iraq, but might affect the relationship between the DOD and some industries in the long 
run.   
By being traditionally very vertically integrated, the military is competing 
with its suppliers.  Industries might be adversely affected by this competition, some more 
than others.  If security services used to be provided solely by the military, the supply 
base for such services would have been weakened, potentially unable to achieve to the 
quality standards required by the DOD.  Other services, such as delivering supplies or 
running a canteen, might not have been affected at all by the military performing the 
same tasks.  Conversely, outsourcing certain tasks, even while retaining some capabilities 
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can help the government by strengthening the supplier base, thereby providing a 
competitive market for when the military is in need of additional services.   
If the services have already been outsourced, the threat of future 
integration into this sector can increase the governments’ bargaining power.  Major 
companies or industries might try to exercise political pressure, if the DOD decides to 
integrate or not to outsource in order to counter the effects described above.   
 
e. Relationship-Specific Investments 
From the DOD’s perspective, the high investments make it hard to decide 
if this criterion supports the decision for outsourcing.  
Working with the military, especially in a combat zone, could result in 
high costs for the contractor.  Even performing ordinary tasks such as providing a canteen 
or trucking supplies can become expensive in Iraq.  The execution happens far away from 
existing infrastructure.  Security requires thorough screening of all employees and 
protection of facilities and workers.  Lynch et al. point out that insurance premiums in a 
war zone are extremely costly (58).  Assimilating commercial activities into the military 
organization carries a high cost of adapting the equipment of those companies to military 
requirements or standards.  In addition, it raises the question of confidentiality of 
information provided to contractors by the military (s. paragraph ‘Information and 
Proprietary Rights’).   
The costs of a relationship specific investment have two dimensions.  On 
one side is the total amount that will be invested.  On the other side is the relationship 
specificity; the degree to which the investment is only useful for the relationship in 
question.  The following examples demonstrate the difference.  Material investments by a 
company that will provide food services in Iraq can be low.  It needs to buy the 
equipment, set up a supply system and hire the necessary people to run the facility.  
These assets can easily be used for similar services outside the military.  Their specificity 
is consequently also low.  A firm contracted to provide maintenance for artillery pieces 
might not require high investments.  Tools and supplies are often provided by the 
military.  The personnel needs to be compensated, but training might be paid for by the 
military if the firm hired former soldiers.  As the market for this kind of service is very 
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small outside the military, the relationship specific investment dimension would be high.  
A contractor operating major weapon systems for the military in Iraq faces not only high 
investments to do so, but also a very high relationship specificity.  Figure 3 illustrates 
these arguments. 
The investments and the specificity might also change over time.  
Investments into training are currently low for security companies hiring former Special 
Forces to fulfill their contracts in Iraq.  Avant says that “[s]ome analysts argue that 
contractors are ultimately cheaper because they allow the military to avoid the expense of 
recruiting, training, and deploying personnel.  But most contractors are recruited and 
trained by governments at some point in their careers.”  As a potential result of the 
efficiency and effectiveness of outsourcing security services, the military might decide to 
no longer have any Special Forces of its own.  The investments by these security 
companies, and consequently the prices they charge, would increase, as the firms have to 
pay for the training themselves.  If the government intends to keep Special Forces, they 
might have to pay higher salaries to prevent the soldiers from leaving the Armed Forces 
as soon after their training as possible. 
Any contractor that makes these investments has to be concerned with 
recouping the costs.  Considering the alleged short time of operations in Iraq, the firm has 
to do so fast, as the services or equipments might not be useful after the end of the war.  
But several factors favor the firm.  The cost of actual labor can be comparatively cheap, 
depending on whom the company hires.  For employees of security firms, the pay can 
vary from U.S. $ 30,000 a month for a former Green Beret to just U.S. $ 250 for a 
Kurdish Pesh Merga (Council on Foreign Relations).  Many other companies employ for 
the majority of jobs local or ‘imported’ workforces who are not paid to American 
standards.  Even some of the required equipment is cheap.  Security firms can buy 
surplus military gear, especially small arms, etc.  According to Smith’s theorem, an 
individual must make up-front investments of time and/or money to develop special skills 
(Besanko, Dranove, and Shanley 119).  With the dramatically increased demand for 
qualified civilian security personnel, PMFs aggressively recruit from government 
agencies.  Many of the security staff in Iraq are former military or law enforcement 
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personnel.38  Finally, the integration of support activities into an operational network is 
only at its beginning stages and not necessarily enforced, thus sparing the firm some 
investments.  Besanko, Dranove, and Shanley conclude that the majority of the activities 
performed by the PMFs do not require great investments (119).   
Buzzell states that the operating cost savings have to be substantial to 
justify vertical integration (94).  Without published, detailed, direct and indirect cost 
resulting from outsourcing activities, it cannot be determined if all investments were 
considered when making the decision and if, indeed, outsourcing was the more efficient 
way. 
 
Questions to consider: 
 
 Who bears the financial risk of investments resulting from the 
sourcing decision? 
 
 What is the impact on military operations if investments are 














                                                 
38 Compare with Appendix II. 
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f. Coordination and Management within the Stages of the Value 
Chain 
This criterion does not support the outsourcing decision.   
The success of the Armed Forces in Iraq in managing contracts appears to 
be mixed, mainly due to the inadequate number of personnel assigned to the management 
of contracts and insufficient training (Government Accountability Office, GAO-04-854 
42 - 45).  Campbell explains that the relationship between contractor and the government 
is governed by the Terms and Conditions of their contract (5).  He emphasizes that only a 
Contracting officer (KO) can direct a contractor and that consequently the “[c]ommander 
must ‘manage’ contractor personnel through the contracting process” (5).  It also could 
increase bureaucracy when military commanders and contractors have to coordinate the 
actions in the theater, especially when both sides have no experience in cooperation on 
this level.  Everyone familiar with the normal proceedings of this process will recognize 
that it is often not convenient on a battlefield.  Military commanders might also not have 
the education to deal with contractors under battle stress.  Isenberg claims that in 2003 
then Army Secretary Thomas E. White raised the question whether it is within the 
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capability of the Army to effectively manage the “force of private contractors” (20).  
Failure in management can lead to casualties and additional cost.  According to Grant, 
“[o]ne of the major sources of administrative costs of vertically related business arise 
from coordinating businesses that, in strategic terms, are very different” (322).  Brickley, 
Smith, and Zimmermann point out that the necessity for better coordination between 
activities could justify vertical integration (524).   
The military has begun to counter these problems by deploying 
contracting officers to deployment areas to shorten the reaction times.  The GAO 
investigated the military’s management capabilities at the example of Logistic Support 
Contracts in its report GAO-04-854.  The report notes that the customer (the Armed 
Forces) often did not provide the necessary oversight to ensure the economical and 
efficient execution of the contract or to control the contract’s cost (3).  The report also 
states that the Army did not always follow its own regulations when planning for OIF 
with regard to including contractors in the planning process (14).  Other Army 
organizations and the other branches seemed to be more successful in their management 
efforts.  But the Air Force, for example, at the time of the report could not account for 
equipment that was purchased worth U.S $ 2 million (Government Accountability Office, 
GAO-04-854 24). 
The same report also found that the Armed Forces performed less than 
optimal in defining their requirements.  In one extreme example, the requirements were 
overstated by 97%, which does not reflect good management of all stages of the value 
chain (Government Accountability Office, GAO-04-854 36). 
Other factors also affect the coordination efforts.  As mentioned in the 
paragraph above, U.S. military doctrine stresses the importance of integration of all 
players on the battlefield into one common network.  The Lexington Institute points out 
that “timely, accurate and comprehensive battlespace situational awareness, […] is 
effective only where intelligence, operational and logistical capabilities are part of a 
cohesive, integrated network” (15).  With civilian firms replacing military units this 
necessity does not go away, but its fulfillment becomes more complicated.  Besides the 
technical obligations discussed earlier, the main emphasis for the deployed military is 
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contract management.  It normally either involves the execution of existing contracts or 
the award of new contracts in support of the operation.  New contracts can be regular 
contracts negotiated and signed in the U.S., or so called contingency contracts, which in 
their majority are awarded in the theater of operations.  Contracts are the exclusive 
responsibility of a contracting officer.  He is the point of contact between the customers 
of the contract and the company performing the contract.   
A contract award must be fast enough to satisfy the military requirement 
in time.  After the award, a military commander can only require a contractor to carry out 
tasks that are clearly defined and covered by the contract.  The commander can also not 
directly enforce provisions within the contract as well as not settle disputes.  The military 
channels must be close and fast enough to allow fast turn around times whenever 
problems with a contract occur.  It would have an especially negative impact if a contract 
dispute could not be solved in theater, but would result in legal actions.  The success 
depends significantly on the experience of the contract officers and the government as a 
whole in managing outsourced activities.  Adding to the coordination workload of the 
military commander is the requirement of contingency plans for failed contractor support.  
DOD Instruction 3020.37 requires military components working with contractors which 
perform “essential services” to develop and implement plans to ensure the continuation of 
those services in a crisis situation (Department of Defense 2). 
The performance under a contract is often subject to litigation in the U.S.  
It is likely that conflicts also will and did arise over the interpretation of contracts outside 
the U.S. or on a battlefield. While we can safely assume that most contractors will try 
everything within their capabilities to support troops in combat, the local commander will 
have to deal with these disputes.  Zamparelli argues that “the component commander 
cannot compel contractors to perform, even under contract, if it would force them to go 
into harm’s way” (13).39  Fredland, on the other side, argues that “[t]he firm’s power is 




                                                 
39 Compare with assistant Secretary of the Army JP-04, Chapter V, Article 15 - Discipline. 
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Questions to consider: 
 
 Does the local military commander have the means to utilize 
contracts in a way that supports his operations in a timely 
manner? 
 
g. Taxes and Regulations 
The criterion supports outsourcing in Iraq, especially when taking self- 
imposed regulations in order to support new military concepts (‘lean’) and public 
perception of the war into account. 
Grant concentrates on transaction costs in the form of taxes.  But he also 
explains that “[t]ransactions costs may take the form of […] regulations” and that the 
degree of vertical integration can appropriately be used to cheat on quotas (321).  One 
significant obstacle to the deployment of military forces could be regulations that limit 
the number of uniformed personnel/service members allowed to enter an area of 
operations.  Internal or external regulations might put limitations on the number of 
uniformed personnel the DOD can deploy.  Internally, Congress can constrain the 
President’s ability to conduct operations by only allowing a certain number of members 
of the Armed Forces to be deployed.  Congress accomplishes its controlling power by 
requiring the executive to seek a new approval if it wants to go beyond the original 
numbers.  This would result in a new discussion and another vote.  Externally, 
international laws, UN regulations, or host nation40 laws and concerns may try to put a 
ceiling on the number of foreign troops entering a country. 
The need to overcome such restrictions was one of the reasons given by 
Joint Publication 4-0 - Doctrine for Logistic Support of Joint Operations41 (Assistant 
Secretary of the Army, JP4-0 V-1) and report GAO-03-695 on why the government chose 
to use contractors in the Balkans and partly in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
                                                 
40 ‘Host nation’ describes a country in which US or other foreign troops are deployed and operating.  
The term ‘host’ does normally, but must not necessarily indicate that the troops are invited by this nation. 
41 This publication is normally referred to as JP 4-0. 
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In Bosnia in 1995, for example, the Army was restrained by a presidential 
order not to call up more than 4,300 reservists.  It consequently turned to contractors 
(Brown & Root and others) to make up for these restrictions (Bianco et al.).  This enables 
the Army, according to Army Regulation 700-137, to adequately support current or 
programmed forces (Army Publications Directorate, AR 700-137 1).  JP 0-4 and GAO-
03-695 both recognize that civilian contractors are mostly not counted as part of the 
contingent of the Armed Forces (Government Accountability Office, GAO-03-695 2).   
Singer claims that: 
Much of the push behind the use of […] firms by the U.S. military in 
recent contingency operations resulted from two factors: congressional 
limits on troop numbers and the reluctance of the Clinton administration to 
deal with the potential cost of calling up the National Guard and the 
Reserves, who would have been other wise required.  
(Singer 37) 
Limiting factors in Iraq were of a more political nature, such as the 
number of reserves and National Guard units that the DOD was willing to call to active 
duty.  With the continuation of the war, there seems to also be a public notion to reduce 
the numbers of soldiers in Iraq.  Nevertheless, the argument stated by the government is, 
in principle, valid from an economic standpoint and the Army realizes the value of 
augmenting uniformed forces with civilian contractors because “[u]tilization of civilian 
contractors in a theater of operation will release military units for other missions to fill 
shortfalls” (Army Publications Directorate, AR 700-137 1).  By contracting out functions 
that do not necessarily require uniformed personnel, the government is in a position to 
deploy more combat troops.  In the words of JP 4-0, contractors act as force multipliers 
and thereby enhance the theater commanders’ ability to fight (Assistant Secretary of the 
Army, JP 4-0 V-1).  It permits the already deployed forces to concentrate on fighting 
tasks rather than support operations. 
If the argument is used to avoid regulations, this can easily be perceived 
(by those who issued the regulations and by the public) as ‘cheating.’  When applying the 
argument, the government therefore also has   to consider the political transaction costs of 
appearing to be dishonest. 
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Questions to consider: 
 
 Can avoiding regulations be interpreted as cheating and what 
effect does this have on achieving the government’s policies? 
 
h. Information and Property Rights 
There is no evidence so far that secure information or property rights have 
been disclosed by the use of contractors in Iraq.  The fact that it has not happened yet, 
does, of course, not exclude the possibility that it might happen in the future.  This 
criterion does not rule out the use of contractors in Iraq, but it requires the decision 
makers to be cautious of the potential dangers of disclosure. 
The DOD has some interest in commercial data not being distributed by 
contractors. Moore judges the barriers to outsourcing in the DOD to have been the most 
intrusive42 (66).  According to him, Congress justified the legal impediments by ruling 
that private firms could pose a threat to ‘national security interest’ (66).  Business 
information that is illegally acquired by companies might be used in future negotiations 
to give these companies an advantage.  But the information that needs to be closely 
protected is technical or operational details of weapon systems and details of military 
operations.  Principally, it is a similar argument as in the commercial world.  The 
consequences can be much more severe if the information is disclosed to unauthorized 
elements. 
The required coordination between military and civilian contractors cannot 
be achieved without distribution of that data.  Especially security companies will learn a 
lot about the safety precautions in Iraq.  Logistics companies are familiar with ongoing 
operations which they are supporting.  This generates the danger of other parties 
acquiring this information through the companies.  That can happen either with the 
firm’s, or some employee’s, knowledge or without.  Attacks on information technology 
pose a special risk. 
                                                 
42 When compared to other agencies. 
62 
The military must also be absolutely sure that the contractor does not 
switch its allegiance during the conflict.43  Not only would this leave the U.S. military 
missing important capabilities, it would provide these capabilities to the opposing side.  It 
also can provide important operational, logistic, or technical information about the 
original side to the opponent.44  Fredland generalizes that “The contractor presumably 
has no loyalty to the state and its leadership” (211).  This statement seems to be unlikely 
when looking at the U.S. Army and major U.S. companies, such as Halliburton.  As 
discussed, many companies employed in Iraq are foreign.  Additionally, U.S. companies 
often only act as a prime contractor, subcontracting portions of the contract to local 
vendors and workers.  Considering the current insurgency in the country, the loyalty of 
those locals is much harder to determine and increases the “hazard of probity” (Fredland 
211).  
 
Questions to consider: 
 
 Are processes in place that determine the exact ‘need to know’ 
for commercial companies? 
 
 Are processes available that help the government to evaluate 
the security in commercial companies? 
 
2. Additional Economic Arguments Given by the Government 
The following, seemingly economically rooted, reasons are given in Joint 
Publication 4-0 and Government Accountability Office (GAO) reports for the decision to 




                                                 
43 Or do so after the conflict.  
44 Compare paragraph ‘8. Information and Property Rights’ in this chapter. 
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a. Contractors Provide Capabilities that the Army Does Not Have 
This argument is a questionable one as defined in Chapter II and should 
not be used alone to justify a long-term sourcing decision. 
JP 4-0 and GAO-03-695 both acknowledge that the military might be 
lacking certain capabilities.  For one, it could be a competence that the military never 
possessed.  This can be due to the fact that the capability is new or included in a weapon 
system that has not yet been operationally fielded.  Isenberg names the Army’s 4th 
Infantry Division (4th ID) as an example.  Their digital command-and-control system was 
still under development and therefore supported by 60 contract employees in Iraq in 2003 
(21).  The author also mentions the many commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) products 
which are utilized in all branches of the Armed Forces.  He explains that the services 
often do not train military personnel in the maintenance of COTS systems.  Instead those 
services are acquired from contractors (21).  The OSD Deskbook Supplement also 
mentions the growing reliance on the latest technology. (Assistant Secretary of the Army, 
OSD Supp. 1)  It could as well be that the Army has a capability but just not as much as 
is required at a certain point in time.  This can often be attributed to the increasing 
technical complexity of systems and the according skills required to operate or to 
maintain them. GAO-03-695 states that the military does not have a sufficient amount of 
some highly technical or specialized skills to provide for massive operations 
(Government Accountability Office 2).  Additionally, the Army might want to retain 
some of their capabilities for a potential parallel contingency, i.e., “to leverage assets” 
(Assistant Secretary of the Army, JP 4-0 V-1).  Campbell asserts one of the significant 
benefits of utilizing contractor capabilities is to provide capabilities that are currently not 
available in the Army (3). 
The military might have indeed lacked some of the capabilities to conduct 
Operation Iraqi Freedom.  It might also have been justified to fill a capability gap through 
contracting as a short-term solution.  For the long-term, however, the lacking capabilities 
should have been the rationale to initiate a thorough sourcing decision process, not the 




b. Contractors are More Efficient 
This argument is a questionable one as defined in Chapter II and should 
not be used to justify a sourcing decision. 
As described earlier, the government, and especially the DOD since the 
end of the Cold War, is under constant pressure to spend less money.  Singer suggests 
that the privatization movement “reflects the current assumption that the private sector is 
both more efficient and more effective” (13).  A GAO report, however, states that neither 
DOD nor any of the other involved government agencies have complete data on the costs 
associated with the use of contractors (Government Accountability Office, GAO-05-737 
4).  Even on the contracting level, costing information was not readily available 
(Government Accountability Office, GAO-05-737 4).   
From the available data, it cannot be concluded that the reasons stated by 
the government as to why it is beneficial to outsource activities on the battlefield are 
valid or partially valid.  Investigating if the outsourced activities are indeed more 
effective than a government office is also beyond the scope of this paper.  But effective 
execution of an activity is always a prerequisite for any sourcing decision, and never the 
justification in itself. 
 
c. Contractors are More Effective 
Effectiveness alone is another questionable argument.  When considering 
civilian contractors more ‘effective,’ the DOD mostly refers to two assumptions.  One, 
that it is easier and faster for the military to outsource an activity required in case of a 
deployment than to develop the same capability within the Armed Forces.  And two, that 
for some capabilities that experience frequent changes, contractors are better suited as 
they are more flexible in adapting to these changes, as well as to new technologies.   
During OIF, at times the DOD utilized new equipment which sometimes 
was still in its development phase.  Among the examples is the new Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAV) or devices to counter Improvised Explosive Devices (IED).  The 
operation or the maintenance of these systems constitutes new skills for the military. 
“The continued introduction of these high-tech systems into our arsenal has meant more 
reliance on contracted personnel to provide unique field service representation to 
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maintain these highly complicated and dynamic systems” (McBride 2).  The training of 
military personnel would take time and money.  Using contractors allowed  deployment 
of the system faster and before the design was stable enough to justify a lengthy process 
of military training for it.  
As for some of the other government rationales, better effectiveness is a 
prerequisite to choosing a provider.  But the decision makers also have to investigate why 
it is that one source is more effective than the other.  Consequently, they must determine 
if anything can be done to increase effectiveness and the most beneficial way to do so. 
 
C. DISCUSSION OF REGULATORY CRITERIA FOR OUTSOURCING 
1. Only ‘Commercial Activities’ Can Be Outsourced 
As there is no clear definition of ‘inherently governmental,’ outsourced activities 
in Iraq appear to be commercial in the sense of the regulations. 
There seems to be a common understanding that the government should only 
conduct activities that are governmental and not commercial.  The conception of what 
actually is governmental is less clear.  There are several approaches to determine which 
activities the government should retain.  Some argue that activities that are more 
effectively performed by the market place should be outsourced.  Yergin and Stanislaw 
refer back to Al Gore’s ‘Reinventing Government’ initiative, recommending “spinning 
off functions to the private sector that are better accomplished there” (358).  Gordon also 
believes that to ensure the success of a job it should be privatized if it can be done 
effectively (Marketplace).  Others believe that everything that can be done by a 
commercial activity should be done commercially.  In 1988, the President’s Commission 
on Privatization suggested the federal government should not enter competition with the 
private sector if the required goods or services are commercially available (Blue Ribbon 
Commission Appendix, xviii).  Grimsey and Lewis quote Seldon in saying that “the 
larger part of the public sector is a political artifact, not an economic necessity or a public 
preference” (94).  Arguing along the same line but reversing the statement, Gordon 
advocates that “governments should do what only governments can do” (Marketplace).  
Those activities that only the government can do are known as ‘inherently governmental.’  
In the commercial world this principle is expressed as ‘core competencies’ or 
66 
“specialized expertise” as understood by Prahalad and Hamel.45  For the United States 
government, the Office of Federal Procurement Policy has issued a policy letter in 1992 
in which it defined those functions.46  A-76 uses the same definitions.47  
Military operations are clearly at the top of the list when one thinks about 
‘inherently governmental.’  “Establishing and maintaining a system of law and order has 
traditionally been seen as a fundamental role of government” state Grimsey and Lewis 
(94).  Singer makes clear that a “general assumption about warfare is that it is engaged by 
public militaries” (5).  Not everything that has to do with warfare is necessarily 
inherently governmental.  Policy Letter 92-1 reduces the governmental functions of the 
military to “[t]he commands of military forces, especially the leadership of military 
personnel who are members of the combat, combat support or combat service support 
role” (Office of Federal Procurement Policy Appendix A).  It does not further define 
which functions in the military are to be retained by military personnel.  Secretary of 
Defense Donald Rumsfeld leaves no doubt that there is much to outsource for the 
military.  He also appears to refer to the actual ‘fighting’ as what he wants uniformed 
personnel to do.  At a town hall meeting in Iraq in July 2005, he claimed that many jobs 
in the military can be performed by civilians rather than uniformed personnel.  He said: 
[I]t’s estimated by people who do these calculations, that we have 
something like 300,000 men and women in uniform today currently doing 
things that civilians can do. So what we've done is over time allow 
uniformed personnel to slide into tasks and activities that are interesting 
and can be done by military people but need not be done by military 
people. And we’ve been in the process of moving some of the military 
people out of those types of activities and into activities that more closely 
approximate the kinds of things an individual who volunteers to serve in 
the military expected to do when they stuck up their hand and said send 
me. (DOD News) 
 
                                                 
45 See also ‘Definitions’ in Chapter I. 
46 See also ‘Definitions’ in Chapter I. 
47 There is one exception. A-76 omits the function of commissioning, appointing or controlling 
officers of employees of the U.S. as listed in the policy letter under (e). 
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Not only are there obviously many commercial activities still performed by the 
military, many activities formerly considered to be ‘military’ are now performed by 
companies.  The distinction between the two is constantly shifting and becoming blurred.  
The United Kingdom’s (U.K.) Royal Navy, for example, has just leased a warship for 
five years to conduct offshore patrolling activities in the Falkland Islands.  While the ship 
is operated and manned by the Royal Navy, the company, VT Group, will own the ship 
and provide all the support services (DefenseNews 18).  Avant supports this argument by 
explaining that “[a]lthough U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld said the Pentagon 
would outsource all but core military tasks, these tasks are changing, and military 
contractors perform many of them.”   
  But where to distinguish exactly between the different functions is still not 
defined as a general applicable rule.  Policy Letter 92-1 acknowledges this problem and 
the difficulty to provide an exact definition: 
The difficulty is in determining which of these services that fall between 
these extremes may be acquired by contract. Agencies have occasionally 
relied on contractors to perform certain functions in such a way as to raise 
questions about whether Government policy is being created by private 
persons. Also, from time to time questions have arisen regarding the 
extent to which de facto control over contract performance has been 
transferred to contractors. This policy letter provides an illustrative list of 
functions, that are, as a matter of policy, inherently governmental (see 
Appendix A), and articulates the practical and policy considerations that 
underlie such determinations (see [[section]] 7).  
As stated in [[section]] 9, however, this policy letter does not purport to 
specify which functions are, as a legal matter, inherently governmental, or 
to define the factors used in making such legal determination. Thus, the 
fact that a function is listed in Appendix A, or a factor is set forth in 
[[section]] 7(b), does not necessarily mean that the function is inherently 
governmental as a legal matter or that the factor would be relevant in 
making the legal determination. 
(Policy Letter 92-1) 
Following the general policy in the letter, the line is drawn between determining 
and controlling policies, laws and their execution (governmental), and merely performing 
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that execution (commercial).  Despite the vast room for interpretation that this leaves, the 
activities of contractors in Iraq appear to be commercial.48   
 
Questions to consider: 
 
 Who determines the factors that decide what inherently 
governmental is? 
 
2. Activities That Could Be Outsourced Must Be Competed 
This criterion only partly supports the awards of contracts for OIF. 
Many of these laws have their origin in former abuses by the DOD and the 
lawmakers wish, and privilege, to exercise the ‘power of the purse.’  But, implicit in this 
process is also the general understanding of a government always having to be ‘fair’ in its 
proceedings. Heberling and Kinsella believe that to be counter-productive:  
This outgrowth of fairness permits a stream of protests that frequently 
result in a costly paralysis of the procurement system.  The preoccupation 
with competitive fairness hinders the use of innovative long-term supplier 
partnering arrangements.  In the commercial sector, the prevailing attitude 
is: Who said business was fair?  A private firm can choose with whom it 
wants to do business, to what degree, and for how long.  Consequently, the 
private sector rarely has to deal with protests as the DOD does.  A 
commercial supplier knows better than to protest.  To do so will result in 
their being "blacklisted" throughout the industry. 
(Heberling and Kinsella) 
The process described in A-76 and related implementation guides should 
guarantee that each outsourced activity is competed before awarded as a contract.  But A-
76 is based on the idea that the government identifies the existing commercial activities 
and then competes them between contractors and the government agency.  As many of 
                                                 
48 This statement is based on the intentions of the contracts.  There is an obvious impact by actions of 
contractors (covered by the contract or not) on the policies of the government.  For example: contractor 
employees firing, apparently at will, on civilian cars, hitting them and causing accidents, are perhaps likely 
to impact the government’s policy of ‘winning hearts and minds’, but it does not fulfill Policy Letter 92-1 
requirement of formulating policy. (A several minutes long video of the incident was viewable at: 
http://www.flurl.com/uploaded/Bareknucklepoliticscom_EXCLUSIVE_10122.html, but is no longer 
available) 
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the activities in Iraq were considered non-existing capabilities or exceeding current 
government capacities, the contract itself (not the activity) was awarded competitively.  
This eliminated government agencies from the competition.  But some contracts were not 
competed.  As mentioned before, Kellog, Brown & Root won a no-bid contract because 
the Government declared that no other company could do that job (Avant).  This is a 
claim that is denied by other firms who believe they could perform the same tasks. 
LOGCAP contracts are somewhat questionable with regard to competitiveness. 
Awarded competitively as an envelope contract in advance to cover potential 
requirements in the initial phases of a deployment (180 days),49 they are used for several 
years in Iraq.  Individual functions are now automatically awarded to the LOGCAP 
contractor without further bidding.   
Even if a competition is performed, it might not comply with the words or the 
spirit of the laws.  Companies can gain advantages in the process when they are 
participating in the formulation of job requirements and then later compete for the same 
job.  Claims of bid-rigging have also surfaced, brought up by the press or competitors 
that failed to secure a contract. 
 
Questions to consider: 
 
 Is the award preceded by a true competition? 
 
 Do the circumstances require to award without a competition? 
 
3. Provider Performance Must Be Technically Acceptable 
This criterion mostly supports outsourcing in Iraq.   
Technical acceptability at the time of the contract award is determined by the 
source selection authority.  It is based on requirements and the contractor’s proposal on 
how to achieve these.  This looks as if it is a relatively straight forward determination.  In 
actuality, the decision includes some risk, as it is also a prediction that the contractor will 
                                                 
49 Compare with CON234 7 – 19. 
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indeed perform to the acceptable level when executing the contract.  The regulations 
partly address this problem with an evaluation of past performance of the contractor (for 
a similar contract).   But adequately evaluating past performance and applying it to a new 
contract can be complex.  The Army’s purchase of bullet proof vests from Point Blank, 
after controversies between this company and the Marine Corps about some vests failing 
testing, is one such example.50  Kelly points to Bechtel, which “hired three 
subcontractors in Iraq that have been fined more than $86 million in the past four years, 
though none had been banned from getting new contracts.”  He quotes Peter Singer in 
saying that the government does not make the firms pay the price for failure.  Frontline 
quotes an audit by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction 
that concludes that "there is no assurance that Aegis is providing the best possible safety 
and security for government and reconstruction contractor personnel and facilities." 
When deciding about technical applicability, the authorities must also decide 
whether similar civilian and military services are indeed identical.  One could argue that a 
civilian child care center faces different challenges than its military equivalent.  The 
safety precautions around the Pentagon child care center after the attacks of September 
11, 2001 seem to indicate that there are at least some differences. 
 
4. The Lowest Cost Provider Must Be Selected 
This criterion supports the sourcing decision, but there is not enough available 
data to determine if the cost information on which the decision is based is accurate. 
The cost determination is basically based on the government requirements 
definition, the contractor’s interpretation of it and his consequent determination of costs 
to fulfill those requirements.  GAO report GAO-04-854 points out that the government is 
often not effective in formulating its requirements.  As a result, the costs quoted by the 
contractor do not necessarily reflect the later, actual costs.  Furthermore, the collection of 
actual costs incurred by contracts seems to be also flawed. GAO report GAO-05-966 
states that program offices lacked reliable cost data for the investigated performance 
based logistic contracts.  The offices also did not update the business cases after the 
                                                 
50 Compare with Lowe. 
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contract award and were consequently unable to determine if the contracts resulted in 
cost savings (Government Accountability Office, GAO-05-966).  Frontline argues that 
firms are not keeping good records either. 
While government regulations control the comparison of costs, the actual 
determination of these costs appears to be often based on assumption and inadequate 
requirements.  This would lead to the whole process being flawed.  Also, fraud is not 
unheard of.  Kelly lists several companies in his article that have paid more than U.S. $ 
300 million penalties to resolve allegations of bid rigging and other offenses.51   
 
5. Estimate ‘All Other Costs and Expenditures’ of Outsourcing 
This criterion is very hard to determine as it is nearly impossible to determine if 
‘all’ potential costs and expenditures have been considered in an analysis.  But the 
following list should give some examples of what needs to be taken into account. 
 
 The SAALT webpage’s FAQs addresses a number of administrative issues 
that could have an impact for getting a contract in an area of combat 
operations.  Examples are: “What Labor Laws Apply to Deployed 
Contractors?”; “What About Contractor Accountability?”; “What Mission 
Training will be Given?”; “What About Hostage Aid?”, “What About 
Workers Compensation?”; “What about Medical and Dental Care?”; 
“What About Uniforms?”; etc.  These questions not only affect the 
performance of some of the stakeholders, but also have a direct economic 
impact, as many of them will influence the final cost of a contract, either if 
the government covers some of these risks directly or pays for them 
through the contract.   
 
 Bailey reminds the reader that privatization of a service does not relieve 
the government automatically of its responsibilities and therefore incurs a 
“continuing need to regulate” (148).  With regard to issues of public safety 
                                                 
51 This involves government contracts in general, not only in Iraq. 
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and public service, he explains that regulation will always be required “to 
ensure that the public need outweighs private interest. And cost will thus 
be incurred” (148).  This responsibility can directly incur costs. 
 
 Another cost affected is the government’s overhead.  Outsourcing might 
reduce the activities of a military unit without immediately leading to a 
reduction in its number of personnel.  The overhead cost per activity 
increases consequently.   
 
 If the number of people on a military installation gets reduced following 
the outsourcing of activities, one potential result is the threat of base 
closure (e.g., BRAC – Base Realignment and Closure).  This would incur 
costs in the form of relocation, environmental clean-ups etc. (see also 
economic effects below).     
 
 The argument that the Army can use money saved through outsourcing to 
finance other activities requires some careful budgetary planning.  The 
particulars of the government budget system can result in lower funds for 
a following fiscal year, when money was saved the previous year.   
 
 Use of contractors can lead to additional requirements for the military that 
otherwise would have been part of the now outsourced activity.  Soldiers 
having to protect and defend contractors in addition to their other duties 
are one such example.  The contract with Halliburton for support 
operations in Iraq, for example, included a case that required the military 
to provide security for Halliburton’s truck convoys (Frontline).  The Army 
realizes that their reliance on civilian contractors in a combat zone creates 
operational cost and requires the allocation of “precious resources” 
(Bolton, Memo 11 June 2002).   
 
73 
 Finally, the analysts have to consider the costs resulting from a failure of 
the outsourcing. 
 
6. Examine the Potential Economic Effects of Outsourcing 
Although no exact data is available for the economic effects of outsourcing during 
OIF, in general, this criterion supports the decision to outsource activities in Iraq. 
The question whether to employ private companies in a combat environment is 
more than a ‘best business’ decision, “it is a political issue enmeshed in economic and 
social considerations” (Campbell 3).  The military is not only used to implement the 
foreign policy of an administration, it also is often used to propagate other policies.  
Being one of the biggest spenders in the U.S. economy, the government can have a great 
influence on the marketplace through its procurement regulations.  The same principles 
also apply to the economies of other countries involved in OIF, especially Iraq itself.  
This paper only considered the economic effects of outsourcing military tasks.  It does 
not take into account the general impact of the war itself onto the economy due to higher 
budgetary costs or rising oil prices or the resulting opportunity costs of an increased 
spending on defense. 
Without detailed numbers, it is nearly impossible to determine the exact economic 
effects of each outsourced contract.  The following list, however, provides a sample of 
arguments that would indicate that having the necessary tasks performed by civilian 
companies, rather than U.S. forces, is economically advantageous. 
 
 The increasing use of reserve units and National Guard can have a 
disruptive effect on the economy in the U.S.  According to Brinegar, 37% 
of the forces in Iraq in spring 2004 are reservists (181).  The companies 
that employ these soldiers have to either find temporary, but long-term, 
replacements or suffer from an empty billet.  Brinegar lists findings of a 
‘Reserve Employer Survey,’ which states that more than one third of the 
businesses believe that the increased reliance on reserve components will 
cause problems for their businesses resulting from the deployment of their 
employees.  Additionally, the buying power of the affected families is 
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reduced.  The Institute for Policy Studies points out that 30% to 40% of 
these soldiers can earn a lower salary when leaving civilian employment 
for military duty.52  Considering the economy as a whole, this effect is 
probably compensated by the increase in buyer power of the contractor 
and his employees.  
 
 The number of new companies, as well as the workload for existing 
companies, increased with the surge of outsourcing in Iraq.  This will 
result in a larger and probably more efficient industrial base that provides 
better alternatives for government and other sourcing in the future. 
 
 Most of the provisions mentioned above are discussed from the 
perspective of the U.S. economy.  Generally, the public would expect that 
the U.S. economy would profit from contracts awarded by the U.S. 
government and paid for by U.S. tax dollars.  In reality, the outsourcing 
decisions will also impact other countries and their economies.  Contracts 
in Iraq have been awarded to foreign companies and many U.S. companies 
employ non-U.S. citizens. 
 
There could be long term negative effects of the decision to outsource certain 
tasks.  The DOD is a very large and complex organization.  Decisions to contract out 
might impact other elements that are not even directly involved with the original activity.  
One such consequence could be what Rendon calls the “ripple effect” (20).  He construes 
that the reduction of personnel in one activity, due to outsourcing, could have the result 
of decreased demand for other activities, for example officer/enlisted clubs and other 
facilities (20).  The possibility of other activities becoming inefficient for lack of 
customers and the consequences of potential termination of these activities needs to be 
considered before the outsourcing decision is made.  This is especially true if public 
                                                 
52 The Institute quotes Army Emergency Relief in saying that request for food stamps from military 
families has increased several hundred percent from 2002 to 2003. 
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employees need to be laid off as a result.  Moore emphasizes that in a sample of 
government employees affected by contracting out; only five percent were left with no 
employment (68). 
Some laws and regulations are supposed to mitigate potentially negative effects of 
outsourcing on the economy; some do so as a side effect of their original intent. One 
example is US Title 10 which regulates the amount of business that government 
organizations have to provide to firms “owned and controlled by socially and 
economically disadvantaged individuals (as such term is used in section 8(d) of the Small 
Business Act (15 U.S.C. 637 (d))” (Title 10, § 2323).  A different paragraph of Title 10 
requires “[n]ot more than 50 percent of the funds made available in a fiscal year to a 
military department or a Defense Agency for depot-level maintenance and repair 
workload may be used to contract for the performance by non-Federal Government 
personnel” (Title 10, § 2466).  While this requirement supposedly should ensure the 
independence of the military from commercial sources, it also has a positive economic 
effect on affected communities. 
Another law started as a measure to ensure jobs within the U.S.  Feingold argues 
that, when enacted, the purpose of the ‘Buy American’ law ensured that American jobs 
were ensured by federal procurement policies.  Known as the ‘Buy American Act’ 
(BAA), Section 10 of Title 41 requires that only U.S. materials or products made from 
U.S. materials should be bought for public use.  
 
Questions to consider: 
 
 Who are the stakeholders that must be included in the analysis 
to determine the economic benefits and costs of an outsourced 
contract? 
 
7. Examine the Potential Effects of Outsourcing on the Military Mission 
Success of the military mission, as well as the safety of those executing it, should 
be the first priority.  The decision to outsource, even when being the logical choice by 
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economic standards, cannot lead to a hazard for that success.  The following problems 
result from outsourcing and might pose a danger to the mission or military personnel. 
 
a. Military Discipline and Control  
In the absence of a Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA, see Appendix II), 
a civilian is not responsible for his actions in a criminal sense under U.S. law.  
Considering the possible drawbacks mentioned when discussing the SOFA, this could 
result in a civilian operating on the battlefield outside the possibility of prosecution for 
potential crimes.  The Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) subjects members of the 
U.S. military to be tried and judged under U.S. jurisdiction in all places (UCMJ 805, Art. 
5).  This means that a soldier (as defined by this law) cannot escape U.S. justice, just by 
being outside of U.S. territory.  This is a powerful tool that helps the military commander 
to discipline and command his troops.   
As described earlier, this law only applies to contractors in times of war.  
In that case, the contractors would also be “under direct command, control and discipline 
of the commander” (Campbell 5).  If a war has not been officially declared by Congress 
and in the absence of a SOFA, a civilian is not responsible for his actions in a criminal 
sense under U.S. law.  The only way a military commander can influence the actions of a 
contractor in his area of responsibility is through the provisions of the actual contract, as 
“[c]ommanders have no penal authority to compel contractor personnel to perform their 
duties or to punish any act of misconduct” (Assistant Secretary of the Army, JP 4-0 V-
8).53  JP-04 recommends therefore that the contracts should include disciplinary 
provisions.  The U.S. Congress tried to close that legal gap with the ‘Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000’ (METJA).  It eliminates the necessity that war 




                                                 
53 At least not in short term. In a longer perspective, the military can have the company remove an 
employee who does not follow directions. 
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(a) Whoever engages in conduct outside the United States that would 
constitute an offense punishable by imprisonment for more than 1 year if 
the conduct had been engaged in within the special maritime and territorial 
jurisdiction of the United States— 
(1) while employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the 
United States; or  
(2) while a member of the Armed Forces subject to chapter 47 of title 10 
(the Uniform Code of Military Justice), shall be punished as provided for 
that offense.  
(METJA) 
 
Questions to consider: 
 
 Are contractors legally responsible and liable for their action 
under U.S. or international law when performing the 
outsourced activity or otherwise? 
 
b. Military and Contractor Safety  
JP-04 states that “[f]orce protection responsibility for DOD contractor 
employees is a contractor responsibility, unless valid contract terms place that 
responsibility with another party” (Assistant Secretary of the Army, JP 4-0 V-7).  This 
protection also has to encompass all gear (e.g., chemical warfare protection) necessary 
for the contractor to perform the required tasks.  It appears optimistic to believe that a 
company can guarantee the safety of its employees on the battlefield.  Consequently, 
military planners and commanders need to include enough additional troops in their 
deployment plan to protect contractors from the enemy.54  As a consequence of their 
status as noncombatants, civilians accompanying a force are only permitted to carry 
weapons in self defense.  The conventions on war interpret this term very strictly.  A 
contractor is not allowed to defend co-workers, company equipment or military personnel 
                                                 
54 As mentioned before, this paper will not investigate the effectiveness/efficiency of this process. 
78 
and equipment.55  Any violation would have the civilians automatically lose their official 
(and protected) status.56  Here, this issue overlaps with the ‘legal status’ concern.  
Contractors will therefore always remain the responsibility of the military unit in whose 
area they conduct their activities.  It must be ensured that their presence does not 
negatively impact the troop operations or the safety of the military personnel. 
Cooperation with the military makes it necessary that the contractor, at 
least to some degree, is familiar with details of the military operations that he supports or 
that are conducted in his area.  Before outsourcing activities, it must be unambiguously 
clear that any knowledge that contractor acquires about these operations cannot get into 
the wrong hands.   
 
Questions to consider: 
 
 Is the military commander required and able to ensure the 
safety of contractor personnel in his area of responsibility with 
the current troop assignment? 
 
 Can contractor activities negatively impact the safety and 
security of the military personnel and operations? 
 
c. Performance under Military Conditions  
No one will dispute that the military often not only operates under 
different circumstances than a private company, it also has to be able to perform its tasks 
under rapidly changing conditions (e.g., deployment).  Contracts that replace all or some 
of the activities of military units must therefore ensure that equivalent capabilities are 
offered.  Military units have often a ‘dual use’ capacity.  Military cooks, for example, 
might be able to act as a corpsman, or they have infantry training.  If the food processing 
part of the unit is outsourced, it needs to be determined who is providing the other 
                                                 
55 For example, ‘guard duty’ in a rear area could also fall into these categories. 
56 Zamparelli goes as far to predict that these contractors might become ‘illegal combatants’ (15). 
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capabilities.  The costs and logistic efforts to perform the remaining tasks must be a part 
of the analysis whether to outsource or not.  This is also applicable to the military as a 
whole.  The DOD is able to cover a whole spectrum of operations, from warfare to 
humanitarian relief efforts.  If outsourcing of one function of a military unit results in the 
decommissioning of the unit, it is essential to evaluate who will take over the other 
functions. 
Obviously, the contractor must also be able to achieve a function under the 
same circumstances as the original military provider.  This includes military standards, 
where required, high performance requirements, often small lot sizes, rapidly changing 
requirements, and quickly changing localities.  Most importantly, can the contractor 
execute the contract in a combat environment if it becomes necessary?  Lastly, the 
contractor must be able to integrate his company and employees into a military 
organization.  This is an organizational question as well as a technical (e.g., networking).  
Joint Vision 2010, for example, requires the complete integration of all logistical 
components into the operational decision making in a theater of operations in the so 
called ‘Focused Logistics’ (Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff 24).  This criterion should 
be determined when discussing technical applicability.  But it needs to take into 
consideration the fact that the circumstances of a contract can quickly change.  
Outsourcing maintenance of tactical vehicles might be technically very acceptable in the 
U.S., but is it still, if the unit deploys into a combat zone. 
 
Questions to consider: 
 
 Are there provisions that would mitigate the military’s risk if 
changing circumstances prevent the contractor from 
performing the assigned tasks? 
 
d. Long-term Effects on Military Capabilities  
One peculiarity of the military is that it has to stay proficient in many 
capabilities, even if these qualifications are not actively required over extended periods of 
time (e.g., if there is no war).  Outsourcing these activities makes sense in an economical 
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way, as it will only incur expenditures when the activity is actually performed.  There is a 
possibility that the military will lose the capability to conduct activities which are 
outsourced for a prolonged time period.  Qualified personnel might leave the military, as 
they are not needed or do not have good career opportunities.  The military might incur 
significant cost if it would have to redevelop a capability that was not performed for a 
long time within the Armed Forces. 
Technical expertise might get lost, if it is not required to stay current with 
developments in its field.  The most qualified people might choose to work for the 
contractor, as they are often paying more than the government.57  “U.S. military leaders 
have voiced concern that the lure of corporate contractors undermines Army personnel 
retention—a worry shared by military leaders from Britain to Chile” (Avant).  Paragraph 
2464 of Title 10 declares that “[i]t is essential for the national defense that the 
Department of Defense maintain a core logistics capability that is Government-owned 
and Government-operated.”  It then restricts outsourcing by regulating that “performance 
of workload needed to maintain a logistics capability identified by the Secretary under 
subsection (a)(2) may not be contracted for performance by non-Government personnel.” 
The other long term concern deals with the timeframe that an outsourced 
service will be available.  The military must ensure that the outsourced activity is 
available, as long as it is required by the Armed Forces (especially considering the issue 
in the first paragraph).  If contracting out the maintenance of a weapon system to a 
civilian company, the military cannot really predict how long this system will remain in 
service.  And especially in times of decreasing funds, systems are much longer in service 
than originally anticipated (e.g., B-52 bomber). Nevertheless, the contractor must commit 
to this unknown timeframe.  The less commonly available the offered service is the more 




                                                 
57 This argument has surfaced lately especially with regard to Special Forces personnel leaving the 
Army or Navy to fill the ranks of security companies in Iraq.  Of course, the problem itself is not a new 
one. The Air Force has the same problems with regards to pilots leaving for commercial positions for a 
long time. 
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Questions to consider: 
 
 Could the DOD lose capabilities in the long-term (e.g., loss of 
people or facilities) if they are outsourced for a certain time? 
 
 Are the contractors capable to commit to supporting the DOD, 
even if required longer than originally predicted? 
 
D. OTHER SOCIO-ECONOMIC ASPECTS  
The decision to employ private companies in a combat environment is more than 
a ‘best business’ decision, “it is a political issue enmeshed in economic and social 
considerations” (Campbell 3).  Heberling and Kinsella see “a number of underlying 
issues (systemic, cultural, and product), which complicate the adoption of a commercial 
procurement system by the DOD.”  Accordingly, there is a number of additional factors 
that need to be addressed in the decision making process.  It is difficult to put a dollar 
value one some of them.  But their effects on the military are as real as any economic 
impacts.  The following looks at some influential factors that are not specifically covered 
by the economic or regulatory discussion.  
 
1. Legal Status of Contractors 
The legal status of contractors impacts directly their willingness and ability to 
perform their duties and, in the end, the capabilities of the deployed forces.  Furthermore, 
the legal status can have significant political impacts.  The military commander (and of 
course his superiors as well as the contractor and his company) must be aware under 
which rules the contractor operates in the area of operations.  This is the basis for the 
contractor’s legal rights and obligations.  More importantly, it should determine the 
treatment the contractor can expect from the opposing forces.58  The borders between a 
combatant and noncombatant are dissolving.  Zamparelli notes examples of civilian 
involvement on the battlefield as the maintenance of TOW59 missiles, the Bradley 
                                                 
58 There is an overlap with Military Factors here.  
59 Tube-launched Optically-tracked Wire-guided missile 
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fighting vehicle, and Patriot missile batteries. Also their support is used in “gathering and 
interpreting of data from the Joint Air Forces Control Center and feeding intelligence and 
targeting information to operators?” (15).  He continues: 
The implications are that, by having a contractor accomplish a particular 
job, field commanders may be asking them to give up their protected 
status and even possibly risk execution if captured. Additionally, there is 
certainly some question as to whether the commander is violating the law 
of war by having a civilian noncombatant participate in combat. (15) 
These issues are addressed in a multitude of international and national laws and 
guidelines.60   Three different categories of laws are applicable.  According to the JP 0-4, 
international, Host Nation (HN) or U.S. law might be relevant (Assistant Secretary of the 
Army, JP 4-0 V-5).  The most important regulations (that might apply individually or in 
combinations) are listed in Appendix II. 
 
Questions to consider: 
 
 Will contractors conduct the outsourced activity within the 
protection of U.S. or international law? 
 
2. Political Influence 
Military activities need to be funded and appropriated by Congress.  Legislators 
often consider other factors than just the effect on the military in their decision.  Elected 
by the voters in their district, they also need to keep in mind the decision’s effect on their 
constituency.  If outsourcing would impact an important military institution in their 
region, they are probably less likely to make this decision.  If, on the other side, an 
activity would be contracted to business in their district, thereby securing jobs and tax 
revenue, they could favor this solution. 
 
 
                                                 
60 For one listing, see the links on the website of the Assistance Secretary of the Army for Acquisition, 
Logistics and Technology (SAALT)  
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Questions to consider: 
 
 Does political pressure influence the decision? 
 
3. Public Opinion 
For a government and a legislature determined in general elections, public opinion 
can become a decisive aspect.  Unfortunately, public reaction is hard to predict.  It might 
be hard to foresee whether military or civilian casualties are easier accepted by society, 
for example.61  Or to anticipate if employed foreign nationals are regarded as mercenaries 
or just as workers.  Singer identifies some examples where private firms were used to 
skirt congressional limits on troop numbers or to avoid the public repercussions of calling 
up the National Guard (37). 
 
 Questions to consider: 
 
 Is the use of uniformed personnel or civilian contractors 
regarded more favorably by the public? 
 
 Which factors can change the public opinion after a decision 




4. International Political Effects 
The undertakings of the U.S. government are always closely followed around the 
globe.  Any activity that the U.S. is engaged in automatically gains legitimacy in the eyes 
of many other countries.  It also makes it harder for the U.S. to criticize any nation doing 
what they are doing themselves.  Consequently, the increased use of contractors, 
                                                 
61 While the number of soldiers killed in Iraq gets currently updated in the news nearly on a daily 
basis, the number of civilians working under government contracts in the same region hardly ever is 
mentioned. 
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especially PMFs, makes it fashionable for others to do so too.  This includes Third World 
countries that might otherwise not have the ability to conduct military operations.62 
 
Questions to consider: 
 
 Does outsourcing of certain activities by the U.S. set a 
precedent that can be used against the U.S. or its policies? 
 
 
5. Foreign Dependency 
In an economy that becomes more and more global, even such laws as the BAA 
cannot always prevent the military purchasing goods or services abroad.  While this 
might often result in getting the best or cheapest product available, it might come with a 
certain degree of dependency.  The DOD has to evaluate the potential of a foreign 
government to regulate a company from that country.  The foreign power could prevent 
the company from performing its contracts, or interfere otherwise, if that appears to be in 
the best interest of that country.63  A theoretical example: the Danish Maersk group has a 
U.S. $220 million contract for operating and maintaining eight Roll-on/Roll-off (RoRo) 
ships (O’Dwyer 24).  If these ships were required for a future operation and the Danish 
government, opposing this operation for political reasons, would forbid Maersk to 
perform the contract, it might have a significant impact on the U.S. capability to complete 






                                                 
62 See Singer for the implications on international security (19 – 25).  
63 During the British-Argentinean conflict about the Falkland Islands, persistent rumors said that the 
French government had a way to remotely ‘defuse’ the (French built) MM38 surface/air to surface missiles 
operated by the Argentinean Navy and Air Force.  No matter if that rumor was then true or not, the 
technological capability exists today and the potentially adverse effects are obvious. 
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Questions to consider: 
 Does outsourcing the activity make the U.S. military dependent 
on foreign governments?64 
  
6. Organizational and Cultural Barriers  
Like all human decision making, the question of contracting out is also influenced 
by individual human behavior as well as organizational.  Heberling and Kinsella list 
several concerns with the current culture within the DOD that make the processes less 
effective than their commercial counterparts.  They believe that “acquisition personnel 
frequently need to know more about how to apply the regulations than about the products 
they buy.”  Also, according to them, the “punishment of the innocent” is widely used and 
publicized in the DOD.  Finally, the two authors deem the ‘commercial’ approach to be 
more labor intensive (e.g., market research, etc.) than the previous government methods, 
and consequently colliding with the constantly decreasing procurement workforce 
(Heberling and Kinsella). 
Moore questions the willingness of program administrators to decimate the power 
of their own command by reducing the workforce (67).  He doubts that those 
administrators are likely to make a decision that outsources an activity that was 
previously conducted by people under their cognizance, thereby reducing their own 
influence and status. 
It can be assumed that all parts of the military share a common set of values (e.g., 
patriotism, honor, valor, ‘brother-/sisterhood’).  Military personnel are, obviously, not 
driven too much by the compensation they receive.  Their motivation is rather intrinsic, 
based on beliefs, and shared among individuals and organizations.  Resulting from these 
common values is a certain trust among all involved.  They depend on the fact that the 
success of the mission and caring for the soldiers involved are the top priorities of 
everybody.  While many of the former military or law enforcement officers working for 
PMFs share the same values as their former employees and colleagues, the companies 
                                                 
64 There are some clear parallels to the economic principle of Source Dependency.  But the 
implications of international politics go beyond the logics of the market place.  Therefore, this issue is 
listed separately. 
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themselves might have different beliefs than the organizations they now work for.   
Rendon classifies the traditional government-contractor relationship as “less-than-
cooperative” with both sides “believing that the only way to manage a contract was at the 
other’s expense” (19).  He stresses the necessity of a team partnership between the 
military and the contractors and that the relationship “requires a mutual commitment to 
work together to the benefit of both parties” (Rendon 19 - 20).  Still, this is a deviation 
from the old system, where only one party with one goal existed. 
 
Questions to consider: 
 
 Are provisions in place preventing a decision that favors some 
stakeholders’ interests over those of the U.S. military? 
 




Many economic criteria do not contradict the outsourcing decisions of military 
tasks, especially during recent contingency operations and the use of PMFs in Iraq made 
in Iraq. But in applying those principles and existing government regulations to the 
situation, some problems also become apparent.   
 
1. Economic Principles are Not Recognized or Utilized  
The government did not show a clear understanding of valid economic principles 
when outsourcing into a non-competitive market or undermining its own relative 
bargaining power.65  The same is true when it states questionable economic arguments 
                                                 
65 That some of the decisions are in opposition to the criteria as described in earlier chapters does not 
necessarily mean that the decision makers did not know what they were doing.  From the available sources 
it cannot be determined if the decision makers were aware of the fact that they acted against some of these 
criteria.  They might have been weighing other factors higher.  It nevertheless points to a deficiency in the 
process, as proper planning should help to avoid being forced to act against recognized principles due to 
other circumstances. 
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(as discussed in Chapter II) for justification as to why activities where outsourced.  
Insufficient analysis of the situation is indicated by lacking management capabilities with 
reference to outsourced stages, as well as by the high dependency of the military on some 
sources and the significant investments required to outsource activities.    
 
2. Regulations are Not Followed or are Applied Incorrectly 
Some competitions were flawed, either due to ‘bid rigging’ or due to overwriting 
government policies.  The delivery of technically acceptable performance is also 
somewhat hampered by insufficient requirements on the part of the military or by firms 
delivering work that did not live up to their promises.  Below standard past performances 
by companies is also not necessarily a factor in the decision process. 
 
3. Regulations are Not Sufficient 
What is required by laws and regulations and how these requirements are defined 
can lead to severe problems in the decision making process.  The lack of a clear 
definition of ‘inherently governmental’ is the factor that probably affects outsourcing in 
the military the most.  Without a legal definition, it is up to the policy makers in the DOD 
to define functions that are retained by the military.  But there is also no published 
description from the DOD.  Title 10 is very broad in its requirement to consider ‘all’ 
economic and military effects.  Without better guidance as to which effects might need 
investigation and how to perform it, many factors (especially long term) could be 
neglected.  Furthermore, in just requiring ‘consideration,’ it is again up to the selection 
authority which value it gives these factors on the outcome of the decision.  This is even 
more apparent, as the A-76 circular gives very detailed instructions which costs, for 
example, have to be included, without including ‘all.’   
 
4. The Military is Different from a Company 
The purposes and actions of a company in the commercial market and those of the 
DOD might be subject to the same economic principles, but their ultimate goals are 
different.  While operating efficiently and effectively is important for the military, it is 
88 
not the only factor influencing the process, probably not even the most important.  The 
sourcing for the DOD can be even more affected by government policies, other socio-
economic factors, and by the success of the military operation.  Sourcing authorities must 




“The first responsibility of a leader is to define reality.” 
Max de Pree66 
 
“The only irreplaceable capital an organization possesses is the knowledge and 




This chapter summarizes the current situation based on the analysis in the earlier 
chapters.  It concludes that problems exist and shows their causes.  It recommends 




The use of contractors for activities within the DOD and military in general, and 
particularly during OIF, is wide spread and apparently favored by current government 
policy.  This seems to follow a trend that the commercial market place is the most 
efficient and effective way to perform these tasks.  It includes the appearance of 
contractors on battlefields, sometimes even their involvement in combat.  The conditions 
that are influencing the source of DOD/military activities can be summarized as follows: 
 
 Laws and regulations, as well as current policy, require the government to 
competitively source all not ‘inherently governmental’ activities 
 
 ‘Inherently governmental’ is not conclusively defined and its meaning can 
change over time 
 
 Economic criteria are applicable to the military’s sourcing decision 
                                                 
66 As quoted in Microsoft Encarta College Thesaurus (1138). 
67 As quoted in Microsoft Encarta College Thesaurus (1125). 
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 Laws and regulations can override economic reasoning for policy 
purposes 
 
 Military operations follow different rules than commercial activities 
 
Recent outsourcing decisions show that problems exist with applying economic 
principles.  Furthermore, existing regulations are not sufficient to cover the process.  
 
C. CONCLUSION (EXECUTIVE SUMMARY) 
The following problems have been identified in the process leading to a sourcing 
decision in the military: 
 
 The military is different from a company 
 Existing regulations are not followed 
 Economic criteria are not applied 
 Laws and regulations are not sufficient 
 
The first two problems are not considered to require much action, although 
realizing the difference between military and company influences the suggested 
modifications to regulations.  The last two however, make changes necessary to the way 
government personnel understands economic principals and to the laws and regulations 
that control the process.  The suggested alterations are listed in the ‘Recommendations’ 
paragraph. 
 
D. CONCLUSION (DETAILED) 
The elements required for a valid sourcing decision exist in the current process 
and are, at least partially, applied by the decision makers.  But the process is handicapped 
by several problems that can lead to sourcing decisions that are potentially endangering 
the economic or military success of the concerned activity.  Those problems are: 
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1. The Military is Different from a Company 
The military being different from a company is a problem in the sense that it can 
negatively affect the process.  It is not a problem in the sense that it needs to be solved by 
transforming the military into a company.  Some of the military’s actions and processes 
might be or become commercial-like, as suggested by the ‘Blue Ribbon Commission,’ 
but it should not be transformed into a commercial entity.  But from the understanding 
that differences exist and will continue to exist follows the consequence that 
considerations for when to outsource an activity go beyond economical reasons.  This 
situation is already partly addressed in existing regulations and will be further discussed 
in the respective paragraph.  
 
2. Existing Regulations are Not Followed 
That regulations are not being followed or are circumvented is obviously always 
problematic.  It might be a sign that the regulations do not match the requirements of 
reality.  This seems not to be the case in the examples examined for this paper.  Either 
‘honest’ mistakes were made due to inexperience or to acting under pressure, or the 
regulations were overruled by policymakers due to different priorities.  Also, some 
companies might have tried to bypass the regulations to their advantages.  In general, this 
appears to be mainly a managerial or supervising problem.  While it deserves the 
attention of those making the decisions as well as their superiors, it does not have the 
most critical impact on the process.  Additional education of personnel and increased 
oversight should reduce this factor significantly. 
 
3. Economic Criteria are Not Applied 
The case examples show that some outsourcing decisions were made when the 
economic criteria suggested performing the activity in-house.  For most cases the 
arguments suggest that the economic principles were not overruled by more important 
factors.  It appears that the decisions were economically based but  
 applied the wrong valid criteria 
 applied valid criteria incorrectly 
 applied questionable criteria 
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This indicates a lack of understanding of the economic principles that control the 
sourcing decision by the decision makers. 
 
4. Laws and Regulations are Not Sufficient 
The existing laws and regulations are not sufficient to ensure that the decision 
makers find the correct balance between economic effects of their sourcing decisions, 
effects on the military operations, effects on government policies, and other socio-
economic effects. 
Title 10 requires the decision maker to consider all economic and military 
consequences.  This statement is too broad, as it gives no real guideline on what ‘all’ 
includes, and it is also not strict enough, as it does not clearly enough define what 
‘considering’ encompasses.  It is to a large extent up to the decision maker (and his or her 
experience and workload) which consequences are included in the process, to what detail 
they are investigated, and how they are weighed.     
Circular A-76, on the other hand, provides a magnitude of detailed instructions 
regarding how to calculate costs when comparing government and commercial activities.  
As detailed as these instructions are, they provide a false sense of mathematical 
correctness of the outcome.  Many of the inputs are predictions and guesses and often 
need to be revised later.  The calculations also neglect long term effects and costs for 
either party.  Consequently, the ‘lower cost’ competitor at the time of selection does not 
necessarily deliver at the low cost estimate on which it was selected. 
Finally, the current government policies towards priorities for military sourcing 
need to be more clearly formulated.  All laws and regulations as well as public statements 
by policymakers agree that outsourcing is a tool that the DOD wants to apply extensively.  




                                                 
68 This is a logical consequence from the fact that the variety of written laws, regulations, and 
implementation guidelines and public statements on this subject stem from different years, different 
administrations and sometimes different persons within the same administration. 
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E. RECOMMENDATIONS 
1. Increase Education on Economic Aspects of Sourcing 
Valid principles exist that can help to evaluate the economic foundation of a 
sourcing decision.  Decision makers are more and more required to justify their decisions 
with economic reasons.  While it is not very likely that the DOD will become a 
commercial run entity, it will become more commercial-like.  Without substantial 
knowledge of economic theories, they will be unable to apply these important concepts 
successfully  to the decision process.  Without a sound economical evaluation of the 
situation, all other factors cannot be put into the correct context. 
 
2. Formulate Directions on How to Evaluate Non-economical Factors  
With decision makers being under constant pressure to act ‘economically,’ there 
is a danger that other factors, especially when not having short term negative effects, are 
being neglected.  The directions need to offer the necessary guidance so no consequence 
can be overlooked.  They also should provide sufficient information and help to allow a 
realistic evaluation of those consequences.  The ‘Questions to consider,’ as raised in the 
previous chapter, are supposed to give the decision makers an idea what consequences 
they might need to assess and be concerned about.  All the questions are listed in 
Appendix IV. 
 
3. Formulate and Publish a Consistent Policy on the Priorities within the 
Sourcing Process 
Policy makers within the DOD must be aware that any sourcing decision comes 
with a wide range of direct and indirect cost to all stakeholders.  They must therefore 
clearly define, and put in writing, what their priorities are and how the lower level 
decision makers can ensure that their process helps to implement those priorities 
correctly.  All pertinent publications must either reflect the same policy or be formulated 




4. Increase Consideration of Valid Economical and Non-economical 
Factors in the Sourcing Decision 
Based on the increased knowledge of economic principles and the improved 
guidance on the evaluation of other factors, the decision makers must include these 
factors in the process.  Justification of any sourcing decision must include comments on 
the expected results in economic, military, and socio-economic turns, as well as an 
explanation of the priorities assigned to each issue. 
 
5. Increase Management Capabilities for Outsourced Contracts 
If an activity is outsourced, it does not automatically mean that the military can 
leave everything to the contractor.  The last responsibility for the activity will always lie 
with the government.  It is also the military that will suffer the consequences of the 
contractor’s actions.  To ensure competent and real time management of all contracts, the 
military has to have enough contracting officers and train them to deal with the 
companies on the same level.  Additionally, the management structure must be flexible 
enough to support the requirements of military combat operations. 
 
6. Conduct Studies to Evaluate Results of Sourcing Decisions 
To ensure a constant high standard in sourcing decisions, the process must be 
constantly monitored.  This includes long term data collection, starting with the decision 
itself, including actual data and all predicted outcomes on which the final decision was 
based, the performance and management of the activity, and the final result.  Studies 
should be conducted that especially analyze predicted effects of the sourcing choice at the 
time the decision was made and the actual effects experienced.  This would advance the 
process of predicting future consequences and thereby help to improve the basis on which 
a decision is made. 
 
F. RECOMMENDED FURTHER RESEARCH 
This paper mostly investigated the economic principles and applicable regulations 
that influenced some recent decisions to outsource military activities.  The following 
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topics for further research can help to evaluate the outcome of these decisions and 
investigate alternative approaches to the sourcing question. 
 
1. Long-term Effects of Outsourcing 
Research should evaluate if the outsourcing resulted in the expected/predicted 
outcome and if there were additional results that were not a factor in the original decision 
process but that, if integrated, could have influenced it. 
 
2. Alternative Sourcing 
Total outsourcing and complete in-house execution of activities are only the two 
extremes of quite a variety of possible solutions to the sourcing question.  Further 
research should investigate if alternative methods and variations exist that could be more 
advantageous for the military.  Examples for such methods69 could include Long Term 
Contracts;70 Value Adding Partnerships;71 Leasing;72 or Joint Ventures.73 
 
3. Economical Behavior  
If the military becomes a more commercial-like organization, it also will have to 
adopt commercial behavior and principles and consequently be run by commercial 
guidelines.  Some of these principles will be against current doctrines and policies, e.g., 
long term contracts with suppliers.  Before adopting these principles, studies should 
investigate which laws, rules, and regulations would be opposed to the changes and for 
what reasons. 
   
                                                 
69 Compare Baye (204). 
70 Compare with Grant (325) and Brickley, Smith, and Zimmermann (527). 
71 Compare Grant (325). 
72 Compare Brickley, Smith, and Zimmermann (529). 
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APPENDIX I – INHERENTLY GOVERNMENTAL FUNCTIONS 
The following is an extract from Policy Letter 92-1.  It lists inherently 
governmental functions: 
 
The following is an illustrative list of functions considered to be inherently 
governmental functions: (footnote: With respect to the actual drafting of 
Congressional testimony, of responses to Congressional correspondence, 
and of agency responses to audit reports from the Inspector General, the 
General Accounting Office, or other Federal audit entity, see special 
provisions in subsection 6(c) of the text of the policy letter)  
1. The direct conduct of criminal investigation.  
2. The control of prosecutions and performance of adjudicatory 
functions (other than those relating to arbitration or other methods 
of alternative dispute resolution).  
3. The command of military forces, especially the leadership of 
military personnel who are members of the combat, combat 
support or combat service support role.  
4. The conduct of foreign relations and the determination of foreign 
policy.  
5. The determination of agency policy, such as determining the 
content and application of regulations, among other things.  
6. The determination of Federal program priorities or budget 
requests.  
7. The direction and control of Federal employees.  
8. The direction and control of intelligence and counter-intelligence 
operations.  
9. The selection or nonselection of individuals for Federal 
Government employment.  
10. The approval of position descriptions and performance standards 
for Federal employees.  
11. The determination of what Government property is to be disposed 
of and on what terms (although an agency may give contractors 
authority to dispose of property at prices with specified ranges and 
subject to other reasonable conditions deemed appropriate by the 
agency).  
12. In Federal procurement activities with respect to prime contracts,  
(a) determining what supplies or services are to be acquired by the 
Government (although an agency may give contractors authority to 
acquire supplies at prices within specified ranges and subject to 
other reasonable conditions deemed appropriate by the agency);  
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(b) participating as a voting member on any source selection boards;  
(c) approval of any contractual documents, to include documents defining 
requirements, incentive plans, and evaluation criteria;  
(d) awarding contracts;  
(e) administering contracts (including ordering changes in contract 
performance or contract quantities, taking action based on 
evaluations of contractor performance, and accepting or rejecting 
contractor products or services);  
(f) terminating contracts; and  
(g) determining whether contract costs are reasonable, allocable, and 
allowable.  
13. The approval of agency responses to Freedom of Information Act 
requests (other than routine responses that, because of statute, 
regulation, or agency policy, do not require the exercise of 
judgment in determining whether documents are to be released or 
withheld), and the approval of agency responses to the 
administrative appeals of denials of Freedom of Information Act 
requests.  
14. The conduct of administrative hearings to determine the eligibility 
of any person for a security clearance, or involving actions that 
affect matters of personal reputation or eligibility to participate in 
Government programs.  
15. The approval of Federal licensing actions and inspections.  
16. The determination of budget policy, guidance, and strategy.  
17. The collection, control, and disbursement of fees, royalties, duties, 
fines, taxes and other public funds, unless authorized by statute, 
such as title 31 U.S.C. [[section]] 952 (relating to private collection 
contractors) and title 31 U.S.C. [[section]] 3718 (relating to private 
attorney collection services), but not including:  
(a) collection of fees, fines, penalties, costs or other charges from visitors 
to or patrons of mess halls, post or base exchange concessions, 
national parks, and similar entities or activities, or from other 
persons, where the amount to be collected is easily calculated or 
predetermined and the funds collected can be easily controlled 
using standard cash management techniques, and  
(b) routine voucher and invoice examination.  
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18. The control of the treasury accounts.  
19. The administration of public trusts. 
 
This second extract from Policy Letter 92-1 lists functions that are not 
governmental: 
The following list is of services and actions that are not considered to be 
inherently governmental functions. They may approach being in that 
category because of the way in which the contractor performs the contract 
or the manner in which the government administers contractor 
performance. When contracting for such services and actions, agencies 
should be fully aware of the terms of the contract, contractor performance, 
and contract administration to ensure that appropriate agency control is 
preserved.  
This is an illustrative listing, and is not intended to promote or discourage 
the use of the following types of contractor services:  
1. Services that involve or relate to budget preparation, including 
workload modeling, fact finding, efficiency studies, and should-
cost analyses, etc.  
2. Services that involve or relate to reorganization and planning 
activities.  
3. Services that involve or relate to analyses, feasibility studies, and 
strategy options to be used by agency personnel in developing 
policy.  
4. Services that involve or relate to the development of regulations.  
5. Services that involve or relate to the evaluation of another 
contractor's performance.  
6. Services in support of acquisition planning.  
7. Contractors' providing assistance in contract management (such as 
where the contractor might influence official evaluations of other 
contractors).  
8. Contractors' providing technical evaluation of contract proposals.  
9. Contractors' providing assistance in the development of statements 
of work.  
10. Contractors' providing support in preparing responses to Freedom 
of Information Act requests.  
11. Contractors' working in any situation that permits or might permit 
them to gain access to confidential business information and/or any 
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other sensitive information (other than situations covered by the 
Defense Industrial Security Program described in FAR 4.402(b)).  
12. Contractors' providing information regarding agency policies or 
regulations, such as attending conferences on behalf of an agency, 
conducting community relations campaigns, or conducting agency 
training courses.  
13. Contractors' participating in any situation where it might be 
assumed that they are agency employees or representatives.  
14. Contractors' participating as technical advisors to a source 
selection board or participating as voting or nonvoting members of 
a source evaluation board.  
15. Contractors' serving as arbitrators or providing alternative methods 
of dispute resolution.  
16. Contractors' constructing buildings or structures intended to be 
secure from electronic eavesdropping or other penetration by 
foreign governments.  
17. Contractors' providing inspection services.  
18. Contractors' providing legal advice and interpretations of 
regulations and statutes to Government officials.” 
19. Contractors' providing special non-law enforcement, security 
activities that do not directly involve criminal investigations, such 
as prisoner detention or transport and non-military national 
security details. 
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APPENDIX II – LEGAL ISSUES CONCERNING CONTRACTORS 
ON THE BATTLEFIELD 
The following are the major laws that apply to the employment of contractors on 
the battlefield. 
  
A. STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENTS (SOFA) 
SOFAs provide for the status of members of Armed Forces present within the 
territory of another nation (Assistant Secretary of the Army, JP 0-4 V-5).  SOFAs are bi- 
or multilateral agreements “between […] governments that provide various privileges, 
immunities and responsibilities, as well as enumerating the rights and responsibilities of 
individual members of the deployed force” (SAALT, FAQs: “What are Status of Force 
Agreements?”).  While a SOFA could be the most detailed regulation pertinent to CoBs, 
there are some potential drawbacks: 
- Most existing SOFAs do not cover contractors 
- Future requirements of potential contractor work must be accurately 
predicted at the time of SOFA negotiations/signature  
- SOFA requires interdepartmental (DOD, DoS) coordination 
- A SOFA is most unlikely to be honored in case of hostilities 
between the parties 
 
B. CONVENTIONS ON WAR 
Both The Hague and the Geneva Conventions require combatants to be 
subordinate to a military superior and a disciplined organization.74  This is clearly not the 
case for contractors, as they are supervised and managed by their company, while 
contract performance is the responsibility of a Contracting Officer (KO).75  Both 
conventions recognize the status of a ‘civilian accompanying a force’ as long as they 
                                                 
74 Compare: The Avalon Project: “Laws and Customs of War on Land (Hague II) of 1899” and  
The Avalon Project: “Geneva Convention (III) of 1949.” 
75 Compare: SAALT FAQs: “How are Contractors Managed?” 
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have a valid authorization from the force they are associated with.  This would grant 
contractors a Prisoner of War (POW) status when captured. 
 
C. HOST NATION LAW 
In the case that no other international laws or other bilateral regulations apply, the 
contractor is subject to the national laws of the host nation, or in other words, the country 
the contractor is acting in.  Obviously, these laws can differ dramatically from country to 
country.  Negative aspects to consider include: 
- A very confused situation if no law (or government) exists (e.g., 
Somalia 1994) 
- A contractor might be acting outside any jurisdiction, as no U.S. 
administration ever favored extraditing U.S. citizens to other 
jurisdictions, even to friendly governments 
- HN laws might be not considered adequate from a ‘Western’ point 
of view76 
 
D. U.S. LAWS 
 U.S. laws only affect a civilian when he/she is located within the U.S.’s “special 
maritime and territorial jurisdiction,” (Campbell 6) or when the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ) applies to him or her.  The UCMJ is a criminal law normally 
covering U.S. military forces77 anywhere in the world. It explicitly is extended to 
“persons serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field,” but only in a time of 




                                                 
76 As Zamparelli emphasizes “In countries where justice is based upon the Talmudic code—an eye for an 
eye—this could be extremely important” (16).  
77 For an exact definition of who is covered, compare UCMJ, 802 Article2. 
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APPENDIX III – CALCULATING PUBLIC-PRIVATE 
COMPETITION COST FIGURES  
The following is an attachment to circular A-76: 
 
OMB Circular No. A-76 Attachment C May 29, 2003 Calculating Public-Private Competition 
Costs Figure C1.  





Title  Originating Source  Category of Cost  Factor
1 
 
Casualty Insurance Cost Factor  OMB Transmittal Memoranda  Non-pay  0.5%  
Civilian Position Full Fringe Benefit 
Cost Factor  OMB Transmittal Memoranda  Pay  32.85%  
Contract Administration Cost Factors 
and Allowable Grades  OMB Circular A-76  Pay  Figure C6.  
Conversion Differential  OMB Circular A-76  Non-pay  10% or $10 million  
Cost of Capital Cost Factors  
OMB Circular A-94, Discount Rates to be Used in 
Evaluating Time-Distributed Costs and Benefits (Appendix 
C)  
Non-pay  Depends Upon Capital Asset  
Insurance and Health Benefit Cost 
Factor  OMB Transmittal Memoranda  Pay  5.7%  




Social Security Administration  Pay  7.65%  
Federal Wage System (FWS) Pay 
Schedules  
Civilian Personnel Management Service Wage and Salary 
Division  Pay  Multiple Wages  
Foreign Country Operations & 
Maintenance Inflation Cost Factors  Local Determination  Non-pay  Depends Upon Location  
Fuels Inflation Cost Factors  
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller), 
National Defense Budget Estimates for the FYxx Budget 
(Green Book)  
Non-pay  Depends Upon Fiscal Year  
Full-Time, Part-Time & Temporary 
Annual Productive Hours for Civilian 
Positions  
OMB Circular A-76  Not Applicable  1,776 Hours  
General Schedule (GS) Pay 
Schedules  OPM Office of Compensation Administration  Pay  Multiple Salaries  
Intermittent Annual Productive Hours 
for Civilian Positions  OMB Circular A-76  Not Applicable  2,007 Hours  
Labor Inflation Cost Factors for 
Civilian Positions  OMB Transmittal Memoranda  Pay  Depends Upon Fiscal Year  
Labor Inflation Cost Factors for 
Military/Uniformed Services Positions  OMB Transmittal Memoranda  Pay  Dependent Upon Fiscal Year  
Medicare Benefit Cost Factor  Social Security Administration  Pay  1.45%  
Military/Uniformed Services 
Composite Pay Rates  
Military Departments: Office of the Under Secretary of 
Defense (Comptroller) FYxx Department of Defense 
Reimbursable Rates Tab K (All Services)  
Other Uniformed Services: Dependent Upon Agency 
Comptroller Determination  
Pay  Depends Upon Uniformed Service and Fiscal Year  
Miscellaneous Fringe Benefit Cost 
Factor  OMB Transmittal Memoranda  Pay  1.7%  
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Non-Appropriated Fund Pay 
Schedules  
Civilian Personnel Management Service Wage and Salary 
Division  Pay  Multiple Wages  
Old Age and Survivors Death 
Insurance Maximum Taxable Earnings 
(salary limit)  
Social Security Administration  Pay  $87,000  
Old Age and Survivors Death 
Insurance Cost Factor  Social Security Administration  Pay  6.2%  
Operations & Maintenance Inflation 
Cost Factors  Office of Management and Budget Transmittal Memoranda  Non-pay  Depends Upon Fiscal Year  
Overhead Factor  OMB Circular A-76  Pay and Non-pay  12%  
Personnel Liability Insurance Cost 
Factor  OMB Transmittal Memoranda  Pay  0.7%  
Other One-Time Conversion Cost 
Factor  OMB Circular A-76  Non-pay  1%  
Severance Pay One-Time Conversion 
Cost Factor  OMB Circular A-76  Pay  4%  
Special Class Retirement Cost Factor  
(Law Enforcement & Fire Protection)  OMB Transmittal Memoranda  Pay  38.2%  
Special Class Retirement Cost Factor 
(Air Traffic Control)  OMB Transmittal Memoranda  Pay  33.0%  
Standard Civilian Retirement Benefit 
Cost Factor  OMB Transmittal Memoranda  Pay  24.0%  
Tax Rates  
Internal Revenue Service Statistics of Income Division 
Statistics of Income Corporation Sourcebook and North 
American Industry Classification System  
Non-pay  Depends Upon Industry Grouping in Source Document  
Useful Life and Disposal Values  OMB Transmittal Memoranda  Non-pay  Depends Upon the Capital Asset  
1 
The factors listed in this column are factors in effect on the publication date of this circular. 
2 
For social security (i.e., Old Age and 
Survivors Death Insurance and Medicare).  
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APPENDIX IV – ‘QUESTIONS TO CONSIDER’ 
This is a listing of all ‘questions to consider’ that were raised in Chapter IV 
(regrouped in similar topics): 
 
 
 Does the DOD consider existing competition in the market place when 
requesting a proposal and negotiating the contract? 
  
 Can the DOD influence the bargaining power to its advantage via the 
timing of negotiations? 
 
 How can the source dependency risk be mitigated? 
 
 Are the direct and indirect costs of mitigating the risk included in the cost 
analysis? 
 
 Who bears the financial risk of investments resulting from the sourcing 
decision? 
 
 Who are the stakeholders that must be included in the analysis to 
determine the economic benefits and costs of an outsourced contract? 
 
 Are provisions in place preventing a decision that favors some 
stakeholders’ interests over those of the U.S. military? 
 
 Is the award preceded by a true competition? 
 
 Do the circumstances require to award without a competition? 
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 Who determines the factors that decide what inherently governmental is? 
 
 What is the impact on military operations if investments are not/not fully 
made? 
 
 Are the contractors capable to commit to supporting the DOD, even if 
required longer than originally predicted? 
 
 Are there provisions that would mitigate the military’s risk if changing 
circumstances prevent the contractor from performing the assigned tasks? 
 
 Does the local military commander have the means to utilize contracts in a 
way that supports his operations in a timely manner? 
 
 Is the military commander required and able to ensure the safety of 
contractor personnel in his area of responsibility with the current troop 
assignment? 
 
 Can contractor activities negatively impact the safety and security of the 
military personnel and operations? 
 
 Are processes available that help the government to evaluate the security 
in commercial companies? 
 
 
 Will contractors conduct the outsourced activity within the protection of 
U.S. or international law? 
 
 Are contractors legally responsible and liable for their action under U.S. or 
international law when performing the outsourced activity or otherwise? 
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 Are processes in place that determine the exact ‘need to know’ for 
commercial companies? 
 Could the DOD lose capabilities in the long-term (e.g., loss of people or 
facilities) if they are outsourced for a certain time? 
 
 Does political pressure influence the decision? 
 
 Is the use of uniformed personnel or civilian contractors regarded more 
favorably by the public? 
 
 Which factors can change the public opinion after a decision has been 
made and what influence does this have on the operation? 
 
 Can avoiding regulations be interpreted as cheating and what effect does 
this have on achieving the government’s policies? 
 
 Does outsourcing of certain activities by the U.S. set a precedent that can 
be used against the U.S. or its policies? 
 
 Does outsourcing the activity make the U.S. military depending on foreign 
governments? 
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